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1. Choice under Certainty
1.1. Choice Sets
A decision maker (DM for short) has to choose among a set X of alternatives. The
set X is called the DM’s choice set. For convenience, the choice set X will be usually
as u b s e to fRn
+, the space of all positive n-dimensional vectors (x1,...,xn).F o rn =1 ,
R+ = {x ∈ R : x ≥ 0};1 for n =2 , R2
+ = {{x1,x 2} ∈ R2 : x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≥ 0};a n ds o
forth for n ≥ 3.
1For convenience, in the case n =1the superscript 1 is usually omitted and we simply write R+
instead of R1
+.
2Example. In consumer theory the DMs are the consumers, a vector (x1,...,xn) ∈ X
represents a consumption bundle, and X is the consumption set faced by the consumer.
For instance, suppose our consumer wants to buy some furniture for his oﬃce, like
bookcases, desks, and posters. In this case n =3and the consumption bundle x =
(x1,x 2,x 3) consists of x1 bookcases, x2 desks, and x3 posters. The consumption set
consists of all the consumption bundles available to the consumer. The consumer then
has to choose one of the bundles in X.
1.2. Preferences
A DM has, obviously, some preferences over the elements of X.T h e D M m a y l i k e
some alternatives more than others, or may be indiﬀerent among some of them. Our
consumer who wants to buy some furniture for his oﬃce might prefer the bundle (3,1,1)
to the bundle (1,1,3);i . e . ,h em i g h tp r e f e ra no ﬃce with three bookcases, one desk, and
one poster to an oﬃce with one bookcase, one desk, and three posters. This may happen
because, for example, our consumer does not like arts, but he is, instead, a collector
o fo l db o o k sa n dw a n t sb o o k c a s e st ok e e pt h e mi nh i so ﬃce. Therefore, depending on
his tastes, the consumer will rank the furniture bundles in his consumption set in a
certain way.
Motivated by this kind of example, we assume that the DM is endowed with a
preference ordering % deﬁn e do nt h ec h o i c es e tX. The ordering % has the following
transparent interpretation: For any two vectors x1 and x2 in X,w ew r i t e
x
1 % x
2
if the DM either strictly prefers x1 to x2 or is indiﬀerent among the two.
The symbol % closely resembles the weak inequality ≥ deﬁn e do nt h es p a c eRn.
For example, for an alcoholic DM who has to choose the quantity of wine to drink, we
can set X = R+ and his preference relation % reduces to ≥. In general, however, % is a
much more general ordering. For instance, in the example above we have seen how our
consumer can compare the two furniture bundles (3,1,1) and (1,1,3).I n p a r t i c u l a r
(3,1,1) % (1,1,3), even though the two vectors cannot be ordered according to ≥ on
R3. Furthermore, % and ≥ may not agree: for example, if instead of being alcoholic,
t h eD Mi sd r y ,t h e n% and ≥ do not agree in the example above.
3Historically, however, the introduction of abstract orderings like % was inspired
by the “concrete” inequality ≥ among real numbers. This is why typographically the
symbol % seems a Baroque version of the familiar symbol ≥.
1.2.1. Strict Preference and Indiﬀerence
Just as one uses ≥ to deﬁne > and = in R (see Appendix 6.1), from % we derive the
two following relations:
1. For any two vectors x1 and x2 in X we write
x
1 Â x
2
if the DM strictly prefers x1 to x2. Formally,
x
1 Â x
2 if x
1 % x
2, but not x
2 % x
1.
For any two vectors x1 and x2 in X we write
x
1 ∼ x
2
i ft h eD Mi si n d i ﬀerent between x1 and x2. Formally,
x
1 ∼ x
2 if x
1 % x
2 and x
2 % x
1.
It is important to note that
x
1 Â x
2 implies x
1 % x
2
x
1 ∼ x
2 implies x
1 % x
2.
To illustrate this last point, let us go back to our furniture example. The consumer’s
tastes may be such that he strictly prefers (3,1,1) to (1,1,3), i.e., (3,1,1) Â (1,1,3).
Obviously this implies that (3,1,1) % (1,1,3) holds as well. On the other hand, suppose
the consumer’s tastes are such that he is indiﬀerent between (3,1,1) and (1,1,3), i.e.,
(3,1,1) ∼ (1,1,3). In this case, by deﬁnition, (3,1,1) % (1,1,3) h o l d sa sw e l ls i n c e
indiﬀerence is subsumed by %. All this generalizes the familiar fact (see the Appendix
6.1) that for any two real numbers x1,x 2,
x1 >x 2 implies x1 ≥ x2
x1 = x2 implies x1 ≥ x2.
41.3. Properties of the Preference Ordering
The preference ordering % is our “raw material.” We now want to impose on % some
properties in order to get something of interest out of it.
The ﬁrst property we consider is completeness.
A.1 COMPLETE: for any two vectors x1 and x2 in X,e i t h e rx1 % x2 or x2 % x1 or
both.
This is a simple, but not innocuous, property. A DM’s preference % satisﬁes this
property if, when faced with any two vectors, he can always say which one he prefers.
As vectors may be very diﬀerent, this might be a strong requirement. In what follows,
however, we will always assume complete preferences, that is, we will only consider
situations in which the DM can always compare any two alternatives in the choice set.
A.2 TRANSITIVITY: for any three vectors x1,x 2, and x3 in X,i fx1 % x2 and
x2 % x3,t h e nx1 % x3.
This is a fairly natural assumption. Its violation generates cycles, for example:
x
1 % x
2 % x
3 Â x
1. (1.1)
The most troublesome consequence of such cycles is that there might not exist a best
element in the choice set X. For example, suppose that X = {x1,x 2,x 3} and that
x1 Â x2 and x2 Â x3. Transitivity then implies x1 % x3, so that its violation entails
x3 Â x1.A sar e s u l t ,w eg e tt h ef o l l o w i n gc y c l e
x
1 Â x
2 Â x
3 Â x
1
and there is no best element in X.
A.3 MONOTONICITY: for any two vectors x1 and x2 in X,i fx1 >x 2,t h e nx1 Â x2.
Basically, this axiom says that “the more, the better.” To see why, let us write the
two vectors as x1 =( x1
1,...,x 1
n) and x2 =( x2
1,...,x2
n).R e m e m b e rt h a tx1 >x 2 amounts
to:
1. For all coordinates 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it holds that x1
i ≥ x2
i;
52. For at least one coordinate 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it holds that x1
i >x 2
i.
Therefore, every coordinate x1
i is at least as large as x2
i, and at least one coordinate
x1
i is strictly larger than x2
i. If this is the case, monotonicity requires that the DM
strictly prefers x1 to x2, i.e., x1 Â x2.
Example. The two vectors x1 =( 1 ,3,5) and x2 =( 1 ,3,4) satisfy x1 >x 2. Indeed,
x
1
1 =1 ,x
1
2 =3 ,x
1
3 =5
x
2
1 =1 ,x
2
2 =3 ,x
2
3 =4
and it is easy to check that conditions 1 and 2 above are both satisﬁed. In particular,
condition 2 is satisﬁed by i =3 .I nf a c t ,
x
1
3 =5>x
2
3 =4 .
Therefore, Monotonicity requires that x1 Â x2.
The ﬁnal property we impose on % is an Archimedean requirement. To state it we
need a piece of notation. Let x1 =( x1
1,...,x1
n) and x2 =( x2
1,...,x2
n) be two vectors of
X,a n dl e t0 ≤ α ≤ 1.W ed e n o t eb yαx1 +( 1− α)x2 the vector with coordinates
¡
αx
1
1 +( 1− α)x
2
1,...,αx
1
n +( 1− α)x
2
n
¢
.
Example.L e tx1 = {4,3,5} and x2 = {2,6,4}.T h e n
αx
1 +( 1− α)x
2 =( α4+( 1− α)2,α3+( 1− α)6,α5+( 1− α)4)
=( 2 α +2 ,6 − 3α,α +4 ).
In particular, if α = 1
3,t h e n
1
3
x
1 +
2
3
x
2 =
µ
8
3
,5,
13
3
¶
.
We are now in a position to state the Archimedean axiom.
A.4 ARCHIMEDEAN: Suppose that x1, x2, and x3 are any three vectors of X such
that x1 Â x2 Â x3.T h e nt h e r ea r et w on u m b e r s0 <α<1 and 0 <β<1 such
that
αx
1 +( 1− α)x
3 Â x
2 Â βx
1 +( 1− β)x
3.
6This axiom says that, given any pair x1 Â x2,t h ea l t e r n a t i v ex cannot be inﬁnitely
better than x2, and that given any pair x2 Â x3,t h ea l t e r n a t i v ex3 cannot be inﬁnitely
worse than x2. Indeed, we can always mix x1 and x3 to get alternatives better (for
instance, αx1 +( 1− α)x3) or worse (for instance, βx1 +( 1− β)x3)t h a nx2.
It may be useful to remember the similar property that holds for real numbers
(Theorem 6.4 of Appendix 6.1): If x1, x2,a n dx3 are real numbers with x1 >x 2 >x 3,
then there always exist two real numbers 0 <α<1 and 0 <β<1 such that
αx
1 +( 1− α)x
3 >x
2 >β x
1 +( 1− β)x
3. (1.2)
This property does not hold any more if we consider ∞ and −∞, values that do not
belong to R. Speciﬁcally, let x1 = ∞ or x3 = −∞. In this case, x1 is inﬁnitely larger
than x2, x3 is inﬁnitely smaller than x2, and there are no 0 <α<1 and 0 <β<1 that
satisfy the inequality (1.2). In fact, α∞ = ∞ and β (−∞)=−∞ for all 0 <α<1
and 0 <β<1.
In sum, according to the Archimedean axiom there are no inﬁnitely preferred or
inﬁnitely despised alternatives. For example, we cannot consider choice sets in which
a possible alternative is the DM’s death.
1.3.1. Continuity
In some treatments the following continuity requirement is imposed on % .
A.5 CONTINUITY: Let x0 ∈ X, and suppose the sequence of vectors
©
xkª∞
k=1 of X
converges to the vector x ∈ X.I fxk % x0 for all k ≥ 1,t h e nx % x0.
According to this axiom, preference is preserved by convergence: If the DM prefers
all the elements of the sequence to a given vector x0, then the limit of the sequence x
is also preferred to x0.
In presence of the axioms A.1−A.3, this continuity axiom A.5 is equivalent to the
Archimedean axiom A.4.
Theorem 1.1. Let % be a preference ordering on X satisfying axioms A.1−A.3.T h e n
% satisﬁes A.4 if and only if it satisﬁes A.5.
7Proof. Omitted. ¤
Therefore, we can equivalently assume either axiom, A.4 or A.5.I nt h e s en o t e sw e
prefer to assume the Archimedean axiom A.4, but the equivalence stated in Theorem
1.1 should be kept in mind when reading treatments that, in contrast, assume the
continuity axiom A.5.
1.3.2. Example
Let X = R2
+, i.e., the choice set consists of all pairs (x1,x 2) of nonnegative real numbers.
On X we deﬁne the preference ordering % as follows:
(x1,x 2) % (e x1,e x2) if and only if x1 + x2 ≥ e x1 + e x2. (1.3)
I nw o r d s ,t h eD Mp r e f e r st h ep a i rt h a th a st h eh i g h e s ts u m . F o re x a m p l e ,s u p p o s e
that the DM is a peasant and X consists of pieces of land. In particular, (x1,x 2) and
(e x1,e x2) are, respectively, the quantities of lemons and oranges produced by the pieces
of land x and e x. According to (1.3), in comparing two pieces of land the peasant prefers
the one that yields the highest sum of lemons and oranges.
We now check that % satisﬁes the properties A.1-A.5.
A.1 Given any two pairs (x1,x 2) and (e x1,e x2) we can always establish which one has
the highest sum. In particular, either x1 + x2 ≥ e x1 + e x2 or e x1 + e x2 ≥ x1 + x2 or
both. Consequently, by (1.3), either (x1,x 2) % (e x1,e x2) or (e x1,e x2) % (x1,x 2) or
both, so that % is complete.
A.2 Let (x1,x 2), (e x1,e x2),a n d(b x1,b x2) be any three pairs in X. Suppose that (x1,x 2) %
(e x1,e x2) and (e x1,e x2) % (b x1,b x2). By (1.3), this means that x1 + x2 ≥ e x1 + e x2
and e x1 + e x2 ≥ b x1 + b x2.T h e r e f o r e , x1 + x2 ≥ b x1 + b x2 so that, again by (1.3),
(x1,x 2) % (b x1,b x2).T h i sp r o v e st h a t% is transitive.
A.3 Let (x1,x 2) and (e x1,e x2) be any two pairs in X such that (x1,x 2) > (e x1,e x2).T h i s
means that at least one of the two following alternatives holds:
x1 > e x1 and x2 ≥ e x2
x1 ≥ e x1 and x2 > e x2.
8In both cases, x1+x2 > e x1+e x2, so that, by (1.3), (x1,x 2) Â (e x1,e x2). Monotonicity
is therefore satisﬁed.
A.4 Let (x1,x 2), (e x1,e x2),a n d(b x1,b x2) be any three pairs in X such that
(x1,x 2) Â (e x1,e x2) Â (b x1,b x2).
By deﬁnition, this means that
x1 + x2 > e x1 + e x2 > b x1 + b x2.
By the Archimedean property of R (Theorem 6.4 of Appendix 6.1), there exist
0 <α<1 and 0 <β<1 such that
α(x1 + x2)+( 1− α)(b x1 + b x2)
> e x1 + e x2 >β(x1 + x2)+( 1− β)(b x1 + b x2).
By the deﬁnition of %,t h i si m p l i e st h a t
α(x1,x 2)+( 1− α)(e x1,e x2)
Â (e x1,e x2) Â β (x1,x 2)+( 1− β)(e x1,e x2)
and the Archimedean axiom A.4 is therefore satisﬁed.
A.5 Let (x0
1,x 0
2) ∈ X and let
©¡
xk
1,x k
2
¢ª∞
k=1 be a sequence of pairs in X that converges
to the pair (x1,x 2). Suppose that
¡
x
k
1,x
k
2
¢
% (x
0
1,x
0
2) (1.4)
for all k ≥ 1. To show that Continuity holds, we have to prove that
(x1,x 2) % (x
0
1,x
0
2). (1.5)
By deﬁnition (see Deﬁnition 6.6 in the Mathematical Appendix), if
©¡
xk
1,x k
2
¢ª∞
k=1
converges to (x1,x 2), then the two sequences
©
xk
1
ª∞
k=1 and
©
xk
2
ª∞
k=1 converge, re-
spectively, to x1 and x2. Therefore, the sequence of sums
©
xk
1 + xk
2
ª∞
k=1 converges
to x1 + x2. Moreover, (1.4) and (1.3) imply that
x
k
1 + x
k
2 ≥ x
0
1 + x
0
2 (1.6)
9for all k ≥ 1. In turn, this implies that
x1 + x2 ≥ x
0
1 + x
0
2.
For, suppose to the contrary that x1 + x2 <x 0
1 + x0
2.L e tε>0 be such that
x1 + x2 + ε<x
0
1 + x
0
2. (1.7)
Then, by the deﬁnition of convergence (Deﬁnition 6.2), there exists a positive
integer K such that xk
1 + xk
2 ≤ x1 + x2 + ε for all k ≥ K. Hence, (1.7) implies
that
x
k
1 + x
k
2 <x
0
1 + x
0
2
for all k ≥ K, which contradicts (1.6). We conclude that x1 + x2 ≥ x0
1 + x0
2 so
that, by (1.3), (x1,x 2) % (x0
1,x 0
2). Also Continuity is therefore satisﬁed by %.
1.4. Ordinal Utility
In the previous subsection we have studied the preference ordering %.T h i so r d e r i n g
describes the preferences of the DM over the set of alternatives in a given choice
set X. This is our fundamental notion. However, for analytical convenience, it is
often of interest to ﬁnd a numerical representation of the ordering %. Such numerical
representations are called utility functions. Formally:
Deﬁnition 1.2. Af u n c t i o nu : X → R is a utility function if
u(x
1) ≥ u(x
2) if and only if x
1 % x
2
for any pair of vectors x1,x 2 ∈ X.
Utility functions are analytically very convenient. They do not have any intrinsic
psychological meaning; what matters is that they rank vectors in the same way as the
preference ordering %.
In particular, this implies that every monotone transformation of a utility func-
tion is still a utility function, that is, utility functions are invariant under monotone
transformations. To see why this is the case, let f : R → R be a monotone function,
i.e.,
f(x) ≥ f(x
0) if and only if x ≥ x
0
10for any pair of real numbers x,x0 ∈ R.F o re x a m p l e ,f(x)=
√
x and f(x)=l gx are
monotone functions.
It is straightforward to check that the transformation f(u) is still a utility function,
that is, it holds that
f
¡
u(x
1)
¢
≥ f
¡
u(x
2)
¢
if and only if x
1 % x
2
for any pair of vectors x1,x 2 ∈ X. In particular, if u and f are continuous, then, by
Theorem 6.8 of Appendix 6.2, also f (u) is a continuous utility function. By contrast,
if f is not continuous, then f (u) is a utility function which is not continuous.
Since utility functions are invariant under monotone transformations, utility diﬀer-
ences like u(x1) − u(x2) are of no interest. In particular, an inequality like
u(x
1) − u(x
2) ≥ u(x
3) − u(x
4)
has no meaning in this set-up. In fact, it is very easy to come up with monotone
functions f : R → R such that
u(x
1) − u(x
2) >u (x
3) − u(x
4)
and
f
¡
u(x
1)
¢
− f
¡
u(x
2)
¢
<f
¡
u(x
3)
¢
− f
¡
u(x
4)
¢
.
This explains why this notion of utility is often called ordinal utility: only the ordering
u(x1) ≥ u(x2) matters.
Example. Let X = R2
+,a n dl e tx =( x1,x 2) be an element of X. A popular utility
function is the Cobb-Douglas utility function
u(x1,x 2)=x
a
1x
1−a
2 with 0 ≤ a ≤ 1.
Suppose a preference ordering % is represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function.
Then, such an ordering is also represented by the following monotone transformations
of u(x1,x 2):
1. lg(u(x1,x 2)) = lg
¡
xa
1x
1−a
2
¢
= algx1 +( 1− a)lgx2;
2.
p
u(x1,x 2)=
p
xa
1x
1−a
2 = x
a
2
1 x
1−a
2
2 ;
3. u(x1,x 2)2 = x2a
1 x
2(1−a)
2 .
111.4.1. Ordinal Utility in Consumer Theory
In consumer theory one typically solves the following maximization problem
max
x1,x2,...,xn
u(x1,x 2,...,xn)
subject to p1x1 + p2x2 + ···+ pnxn = W,
where W is the consumer’s wealth, p1,p 2,...,pn are the prices of respectively x1,x 2,...,xn,
and each xi belongs to a given choice set X. It is easy to check that the solutions of this
problem are the same regardless of what monotone transformation of u(x1,x 2,...,xn)
you choose to make calculations. This is not surprising. In fact, all these monotone
transformations represent the same preference % and the solutions reﬂect only the
DM’s basic preference %, not the particular utility function used to represent such an
ordering. This further shows that % is the fundamental notion.
Example. In the Cobb-Douglas case, the consumer’s maximization problem takes the
following form:
max
x1,x2
x
a
1x
1−a
2
subject to p1x1 + p2x2 = W.
The solutions2 of this maximization problem are x1 = aW
p1 and x2 =
(1−a)W
p2 ,t h a ti s ,
2Usually, maximization problems are solved with Lagrange multipliers. In our simple Cobb-Douglas
case, however, the solutions can be also found using the following simple steps:
1. A trivial manipulation of the budget constraint gives
x1 =
W − p2x2
p1
. (1.8)
2. By substituting (1.8) into the Cobb-Douglass utility function, the maximization problem re-
duces to
max
x1,x2
µ
W − p2x2
p1
¶a
x
1−a
2 (1.9)
3. We now solve (1.9). The ﬁrst order condition is
a
µ
W − p2x2
p1
¶a−1 µ
−
p2
p1
¶
x
1−a
2 +( 1− a)x
−a
2
µ
W − p2x2
p1
¶a
=0 .
Using some simple algebra we get
−ax2p2 +( 1− a)(W − p2x2)=0
12these are the quantities of the two goods that maximize the consumer’s utility given
his budget constraint. If we replace xa
1x
1−a
2 with any of its monotone transformations
listed in the Example above, for instance algx1+(1− a)lgx2, we get exactly the same
solutions (check by yourself following the steps described in the last footnote).
1.5. Existence
Given the analytical importance of utility functions, the main problem of ordinal utility
theory is to establish conditions under which the preference ordering % admits a utility
representation, that is, conditions under which there actually exists a function u : X →
R such that
u(x
1) ≥ u(x
2) if and only if x
1 % x
2
for any pair of vectors x1,x 2 ∈ X. This is not a simple problem, and it is easy to come
up with preference orderings that do not have a utility representation, as we will see
later.
We now state an existence result, whose proof we omit. In the literature there exist
other stronger results, but this one is very convenient. It is based on the ﬁrst four
assumptions we introduced in the last subsection.
Theorem 1.3. Suppose that the preference ordering % is complete, transitive, monotonic,
and Archimedean. Then there exists a continuous utility function u : X → R such
that
u(x
1) ≥ u(x
2) if and only if x
1 % x
2
for any pair of vectors x1,x 2 ∈ X.
This is a very important result. Almost every work in economics contains a utility
function. Theorem 1.3 tells you what is behind a utility function, which assumptions
o nt h ep r e f e r e n c eo r d e r i n g% are implicitly made by economists when they use them.
Recall that preferences are the fundamental object of interest. Utility functions come
and so
x2 =
(1 − a)W
p2
.
4. Finally, by substituting into the budget constraint x2 with
(1−a)W
p2 ,w eg e tx1 = aW
p1 .
13up because in applications working directly on a preference ordering is often awkward.
In simple English, you cannot take derivatives of %.
Remark. It is easy to check that Monotonicity implies the following property of u:
For any two vectors x1 and x2 in X,i fx1 >x 2,t h e n
u(x
1) >u (x
2).
For instance, if x1 = {1,3,5} and x2 = {1,3,4},t h e nu(x1) >u (x2).
We conclude with an example of a preference ordering that does not admit a utility
representation.
Example. Lexicographic preferences are the classic example of a preference ordering
that does not admit a utility representation. Set X = R2.W eh a v e
x
1 % x
2 if
(
either 1) x1
1 >x 2
1
or 2) x1
1 = x2
1 and x1
2 ≥ x2
2
According to the lexicographic ordering, the DM ﬁrst looks at the ﬁrst coordinate. If
x1
1 >x 2
1 then x1 % x2. However, if x1
1 = x2
1, then the DM turns his attention to the
second coordinate. If x1
2 ≥ x2
2,t h e nx1 % x2. This is, basically, the method used in
dictionaries to order words.
It can be proved that such an ordering does not admit a utility representation.
Check by yourself which conditions (Completeness, Transitivity, Monotonicity, and
Archimedean) of Theorem 1.3 are not satisﬁed by lexicographic preferences.
The formal proof is a bit complicated. For the interested student, here is a sketch.
1.5.1. Sketch of the Proof
Suppose, to the contrary, that such a representation existed. For a ﬁxed r ∈ R,l e t
us look at all the vectors whose ﬁrst coordinate x1 is equal to r, i.e., the vectors of
the form x =( r,x2). The set {u(r,x2):x2 ∈ R} is a nondegenerate interval of the
real line. In particular, u(r,x1
2) ≥ u(r,x2
2) if and only if x1
2 ≥ x2
2.B u t , f o r r 6= r0,
u(r,x2) 6= u(r0,x 2),s ot h a t{u(r,x2):x2 ∈ R}∩{u(r0,x 2):x2 ∈ R} = ∅. This implies
14that there exists a continuum of pairwise nondegenerate intervals of the real line, which
is impossible.
2. Choice Under Risk
In the previous section the objects of choice were vector bundles in Rn,e x e m p l i ﬁed by
consumption bundles. There is no uncertainty in a consumption bundle. In our initial
example, the DM faced a bundle consisting of bookcases, desks, and posters. Once the
DM has decided which bundle to buy, he knows for sure what is going to get.
However, often one has to choose among uncertain alternatives. For example, when
you buy a ﬁnancial asset, you usually do not know for sure how your investment will
turn out. If you buy a share, your dividends will depend on the proﬁts the ﬁrm will
make, and, generally, these are rather uncertain. In these cases your choice has several
possible outcomes. After choosing a given share, you may end up earning diﬀerent
levels of dividends depending on the ﬁrm’s proﬁts. However, one often knows that
one outcome is more likely to result than another one. For instance, you may have
some information about the ﬁrm’s performance, so that you can assess the relative
likelihood of diﬀerent future proﬁt levels. In other words, you can assign probabilities
to diﬀerent proﬁt levels. For convenience, suppose it is known that the ﬁrm will make
either of two possible proﬁt levels, and, accordingly, two possible dividend levels d1 and
d2,w i t hd1 >d 2. Your information tells you that d1 is more likely to obtain than d2.
In particular, you assess that d1 will obtain with probability 3
4,a n dd2 with probability
1
4. Therefore, what matters for your decision to buy or not the share is summarized in
the following quadruple ½
d1,
3
4
;d2,
1
4
¾
which, in a convenient way, tells you that with probability 3
4 you will get the dividend
d1 and with probability 1
4 the dividend d2.
There are many examples like this one, especially in ﬁnancial economics. In all
cases you end up with a list of possible outcomes {x1,...,xn} and a list of probabilities
attached to each outcome. A natural notation is to denote by p1 the probability that
outcome x1 obtains, p2 the probability that outcome x2 obtains, and so forth till pn,
the probability that outcome xn obtains. We can again summarize everything with the
15following n-tuple
©
x
1,p 1;...;x
n,p n
ª
. (2.1)
For convenience, prospects like (2.1) are usually called lotteries. This is a very ﬂexible
notation and you can model in this way most examples of interest. They are called
lotteries since the purchase of a lottery ticket is the classic example of a choice under
uncertainty. In this case, the diﬀerent outcomes represent the diﬀerent prizes you can
get by entering the lottery.
We have mentioned dividends and prizes, which are, in general, monetary outcomes.
H o w e v e r ,i ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tt h eo u t c o m e sxi are very general objects. In
particular, they are vector bundles and have the same interpretation as in the previous
section. The choice set X is again, for convenience, a subset of Rn.O f c o u r s e , f o r
monetary outcomes we have X = R, but it is very easy to come up with examples
where the outcomes are not monetary. For instance, sometimes lotteries do not oﬀer
monetary prizes, but goods. In that case you may need N>1 to describe the outcomes.
2.1. A Bit More Formally
We now discuss more rigorously the set-up. The set X consists of all possible outcomes.
L is the set of all lotteries deﬁned on X.At y p i c a le l e m e n tL of L has the form
L =
©
x
1,p 1;...;x
n,p n
ª
where 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,a n d
Pn
i=1 pi =1 .
The choice set for the DM is now L. The DM has a preference ordering % on L.
Of course, L % L0 means that the DM prefers the lottery L to the lottery L0.T h e
only diﬀerence relative to the previous section is that now % is deﬁned over a set L of
uncertain alternatives, while before it was deﬁned over a set X of “sure” alternatives.
2.1.1. Sure Alternatives as Probability 1 Lotteries
This set-up has the very interesting feature of also embedding in L the “sure” outcomes.
A natural way to think of a sure outcome is as an outcome that obtains with probability
1. For, probability 1 means that it obtains for sure, there is no uncertainty about it.
For example, suppose there is a ﬁrm whose share always pays the same dividend d,n o
16matter what its proﬁts are. In other words, the share is a risk free asset. In this set-up
we can naturally describe this ﬁnancial asset as follows
L = {d,1}.
That is, the asset can be viewed as a lottery whose outcome is d with probability 1.I n
a similar way, every sure alternative x in X can be identiﬁed with the lottery
L = {x,1}.
This is important because it allows the DM to compare sure alternatives with uncertain
alternatives. For example, in ﬁnance there are assets that are basically risk free, but
which usually yield low returns, and risky assets that may pay more or less than the risk
free one depending on which outcome obtains. It is then important to have a decision
theory that can treat this kind of choices, which are very important in applications.
Fortunately, in the present set-up this can be done very neatly.
In fact, even though the preference relation % is deﬁned over the lotteries in L,w e
can also use it to compare the “sure” outcomes in X by setting
x
1 % x
2 if and only if {x
1,1} % {x
2,1}.
Moreover, we can also compare “sure” outcomes and lotteries by setting
x %
©
x
1,p 1;...;x
n,p n
ª
if and only if {x,1} %
©
x
1,p 1;...;x
n,p n
ª
.
For future reference, we record this very useful fact in the following deﬁnition
Deﬁnition 2.1. Let % be a preference ordering on L,a n dl e tx1 and x2 be in X.W e
write x1 % x2 whenever {x1,1} % {x2,1}.M o r e o v e r ,i fx is in X and {x1,p 1;...;xn,p n}
in L,w ew r i t ex % {x1,p 1;...;xn,p n} whenever {x,1} % {x1,p 1;...;xn,p n}.
Example. The DM has to choose between a government bond and an Apple’s equity.
Suppose that the government bond, basically a risk free asset, pays $5 f o rs u r ea tt h e
end of the year, while an Apple’s equity pays a $1 dividend with probability 1
2,a n da
$9 dividend with probability 1
2. The following two lotteries describe these two ﬁnancial
assets
{5,1} and
½
1,
1
2
;9,
1
2
¾
.
17Using the notation of Deﬁnition 2.1, if the DM (weakly) prefers the government bond
we write
5 %
½
1,
1
2
;9,
1
2
¾
.
If the DM strictly prefers the government bond we write
5 Â
½
1,
1
2
;9,
1
2
¾
a n d ,i ft h eD Mi si n d i ﬀerent between the government bond and the equity we write
5 ∼
½
1,
1
2
;9,
1
2
¾
.
2.1.2. Compound Lotteries
Take any two lotteries L = {x1,p 1;x2,p 2} and e L = {e x1, e p1;e x2, e p2} in L. Of course,
p2 =1−p1 and e p2 =1− e p1. We can represent them with the following simple decision
trees:
Figure 1 here
On the basis of L and e L, we can construct a third lottery L0 as follows: with probability
p0
1 you get a ticket to participate in lottery L, and with probability p0
2, a ticket for lottery
e L (recall that, by deﬁnition of probability, p0
2 =1−p0
1). Lottery L0 is described by the
following decision tree:
Figure 2 here
These kinds of lotteries are called compound lotteries and they are lotteries whose
outcomes are lotteries. One might think th a tw ec a n n o td e a lw i t ht h e mi no u rs e t - u p
since we have assumed that outcomes are elements of X, the set of “sure” alternatives.
However, this is not the case. Indeed, as long as the DM looks only at the “ﬁnal”
outcomes, and does not like gambling in itself, it seems reasonable to assume that the
two following decision trees are equivalent for him:
Figure 3 here.
If this is the case, then the compound lottery L0 is equivalent to the standard lottery
©
x
1,p
0
1p1;x
2,p
0
1p2;e x
1,p
0
2e p1;e x
2,p
0
2e p2
ª
18For example, suppose X = R+, L =
©
2, 1
3;5, 2
3
ª
and e L =
©
3, 1
4;4, 3
4
ª
.M o r e o v e r ,
suppose p0
1 = 1
5.T h e nL0 is equivalent to the following standard lottery:
½
2,
1
15
;5,
2
15
;3,
4
20
;4,
12
20
¾
.
The following decision trees describe these lotteries:
Figure 4 here
To sum up, as long as the DM cares only about ﬁnal outcomes, we can also treat
compound lotteries in our set-up. In particula r ,i ti sp o s s i b l et or e d u c ee v e r yc o m p o u n d
lottery to a standard one by multiplying the probabilities along the branches of the
decision tree that represents the compound lottery. This procedure is called “reduction
of compound lotteries.”
In what follows we will denote the compound lottery L00 as
p
0
1L +( 1− p
0
1)e L.
For instance, if we set p0
1 = 1
5,a si nt h en u m e r i c a le x a m p l ea b o v e ,w eh a v e
1
5
L +
4
5
e L.
2.2. Axioms
We now discuss several assumptions that one can make on %.T h eﬁrst one is just a
combination of two simple properties from the previous section.
B.1 ORDERING: The preference ordering % on L is complete and transitive.
The meaning of these two properties is the same here as it was in last section. In
particular:
1. % is complete if, for any two lotteries L and L0 in L,w eh a v eL % L0 or L0 % L
or both. In other words, the DM must be able to rank any pair of lotteries.
2. % is transitive if, for any three lotteries L, L0,a n dL00,i fi th o l d st h a tL % L0 and
L0 % L00,t h e ni tm u s th o l dt h a tL % L00.
19The next assumption is peculiar to choice under risk:
B.2 INDEPENDENCE: Suppose L and L0 are two lotteries in L such that L % L0.
Suppose 0 <p<1,a n dL00 is some other lottery in L.T h e n
pL +( 1− p)L
00 % pL
0 +( 1− p)L
00. (2.2)
The two compound lotteries in (2.2) have the following decision trees:
Figure 5 here.
These two compound lotteries both consist of two parts: the ﬁrst one yields with
probability p either the lottery L or L0; the second part, which is common to both
compound lotteries, yields in both cases L00 with probability (1 − p). According to
the axiom, this common part does not aﬀect the way in which the DM ranks the
two compound lotteries. What matters is only the other part, where they diﬀer, one
yielding L,t h eo t h e rL0. The ranking depends on how the DM originally ranked the
two “outcomes” L and L0.
B.3 ARCHIMEDEAN: Suppose L,L0,L 00 are three lotteries in L such that L Â L0 Â
L00.T h e nt h e r ea r et w on u m b e r s0 <p<1 and 0 <p 0 < 1 such that
pL +( 1− p)L
00 Â L
0 Â p
0L +( 1− p
0)L
00.
T h ei n t e r p r e t a t i o no ft h i sa x i o mi s ,mutatis mutandis, similar to that of axiom A.4,
its counterpart in choice under certainty. Speciﬁcally, B.3 says that, given any pair
L Â L0,t h el o t t e r yL c a n n o tb ei n ﬁnitely better than L0,a n dt h a tg i v e na n yp a i r
L0 Â L00,t h el o t t e r yL00 c a n n o tb ei n ﬁnitely worse than L0. Indeed, we can always mix
L and L00 to get lotteries better (for instance, pL +( 1− p)L00) or worse (for instance,
p0L +( 1− p0)L00)t h a nL0. Therefore, according to the Archimedean axiom there are
no inﬁnitely preferred or inﬁnitely despised lotteries.
2.3. Expected Utility
The axioms stated in the last section lead to a fundamental theorem, due to von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). It is often called the von Neumann-Morgenstern
Representation Theorem.
202.3.1. A Bit of Notation
Given a lottery L = {x1,p 1;...;xn,p n}, the set of its possible outcomes {x1,x 2,...,xn}
is called the support of L, and it is denoted by supp(L). For example, if X = R,a n d
L =
©
1, 1
4;3, 1
2;5, 1
8;10, 1
8
ª
,t h e n
supp(L)={1,3,5,10}.
Moreover, for notational convenience, we write pL(x1) in lieu of p1, pL(x2) in lieu of
p2,...,pL(xn) in lieu of xn. Under this notation we write L =
©
x1,p L(x1);...;xn,p L(xn)
ª
in lieu of {x1,p 1;...;xn,p n}. For instance, if L =
©
1, 1
4;3, 1
2;5, 1
8;10, 1
8
ª
,t h e n
p
L(1) =
1
4
,p
L(3) =
1
2
,p
L(5) =
1
8
,p
L(10) =
1
8
.
Finally, you should become familiar with the summation symbol
P
.I t s m e a n i n g i s
obvious: given a sequence r1,...,rn of real numbers, we denote by
n X
i=1
ri
the sum r1 + ···+ rn. For example, if L =
©
x1,p L(x1);...;xn,p L(xn)
ª
,t h e n
X
x∈supp(L)
u(x)p
L(x)=u(x
1)p
L(x
1)+···+ u(x
n)p
L(x
n).
2.3.2. The Theorem
Equipped with this notation, we are in a position to state the von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s celebrated result.
Theorem 2.2. Let % be a preference ordering on the set L of all lotteries deﬁned on a
space X. The ordering % satisﬁes axioms B.1, B.2,a n dB.3 if and only if there exists
af u n c t i o nu : X → R such that
L % L
0 if and only if
X
x∈supp(L)
u(x)p
L(x) ≥
X
x∈supp(L)
u(x)p
L0
(x)
Moreover, such a function u is unique up to positive linear transformations, i.e., u0 does
as well as u if and only if constants α>0 and β exist such that u0(x)=αu(x)+β.
21Example. Take L =
©
1, 1
4;3, 1
2;5, 1
8;10, 1
8
ª
,a n dL0 =
©
2, 1
3;3, 1
5;4, 1
5;15, 4
15
ª
.T h ev o n
Neumann and Morgenstern Theorem says that there exists a function u such that, for
a DM whose preference % satisﬁes the behavioral assumptions B1, B2,a n dB3, we
have L % L0 if and only if
u(1)
1
4
+ u(3)
1
2
+ u(5)
1
8
+ u(10)
1
8
≥ u(2)
1
3
+ u(3)
1
5
+ u(4)
1
5
+ u(15)
4
15
. (2.3)
For instance, suppose u(x)=x2.T h e n
u(1)
1
4
+ u(3)
1
2
+ u(5)
1
8
+ u(10)
1
8
=( 1 )
2 1
4
+( 3 )
21
2
+( 5 )
21
8
+( 1 0 )
21
8
u(2)
1
3
+ u(3)
1
5
+ u(4)
1
5
+ u(15)
8
15
=( 2 )
21
3
+( 3 )
21
5
+( 4 )
21
5
+( 1 5 )
2 4
15
Doing some trivial calculations we get
u(1)
1
4
+ u(3)
1
2
+ u(5)
1
8
+ u(10)
1
8
=
163
8
' 20.4
u(2)
1
3
+ u(3)
1
5
+ u(4)
1
5
+ u(15)
4
15
=
995
15
' 66.3
so that
u(2)
1
3
+ u(3)
1
5
+ u(4)
1
5
+ u(15)
4
15
>u (1)
1
4
+ u(3)
1
2
+ u(5)
1
8
+ u(10)
1
8
and, by Theorem 2.2, we conclude that
L
0 Â L
so that the DM strictly prefers lottery L0 to lottery L.
The great importance of this result is that it provides a sound behavioral foundation
for expected utility. Before von Neumann and Morgenstern, other scholars, in the wake
of Bernoulli (1713), used this rule to compare lotteries. But, it was used as a rule of
thumb, very convenient for calculations, but nobody knew what the behavioral impli-
cations of its use were. Besides technical convenience, there was no basis for expected
utility. The fundamental importance of the von Neumann and Morgenstern Theorem
is to have shown that such a convenient rule is based on the very intuitive behavioral
assumptions B.1,B.2,a n dB.3. In other words, it is not only a very convenient rule,
but also one with a very strong behavioral foundation.
222.3.3. The Function u
The function u is actually a utility function on the set of outcomes X in the sense
of the previous section. We have seen that it is possible to identify in this set-up a
“sure” outcome with a probability 1 lottery, i.e. {x,1}. In particular, we can write
equivalently x % x0 and {x,1} % {x0,1}. But, by the von Neumann and Morgenstern
Theorem,
{x,1} % {x
0,1} if and only if u(x) ≥ u(x
0)
so that
x % x
0 if and only if u(x) ≥ u(x
0)
which shows that u is a utility function. It is usually called the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function (vN-M utility function, for short).
However, this time u is invariant only up to positive linear transformations, and is
not monotonic. To see why is very easy. Suppose L and L0 are two lotteries such that
X
x∈supp(L)
u(x)p
L(x) ≥
X
x∈supp(L0)
u(x)p
L0
(x). (2.4)
A positive aﬃne transformation e u of u has the form e u(x)=αu(x)+β,w h e r eα>0
and β are two constants. Then
X
x∈supp(L)
e u(x)p
L(x)=
X
x∈supp(L)
[αu(x)+β]p
L(x)=β + α
X
x∈supp(L)
u(x)p
L(x)
But, by inequality (2.4), we have
β + α
X
x∈supp(L)
u(x)p
L(x) ≥ β + α
X
x∈supp(L0)
u(x)p
L0
(x)
so that we can write
X
x∈supp(L)
e u(x)p
L(x)=
X
x∈supp(L)
[αu(x)+β]p
L(x)=β + α
X
x∈supp(L)
u(x)p
L(x)
≥ β + α
X
x∈supp(L0)
u(x)p
L0
(x)=
X
x∈supp(L0)
[αu(x)+β]p
L0
(x)
=
X
x∈supp(L0)
e u(x)p
L0
(x).
23which implies X
x∈supp(L)
e u(x)p
L(x) ≥
X
x∈supp(L0)
e u(x)p
L0
(x).
Therefore, to rank lotteries we can indiﬀerently use u and e u. However, only positive
linear transformations work. In fact, it is not hard to come up with monotone functions
f : R → R such that
X
x∈supp(L)
u(x)p
L(x) ≥
X
x∈supp(L0)
u(x)p
L0
(x)
but X
x∈supp(L)
f (u(x))p
L(x) <
X
x∈supp(L)
f (u(x))p
L0
(x).
For example, let L =
©
1, 1
3;3, 1
3;5, 1
3
ª
and L0 =
©
1, 3
4;8, 1
4
ª
.S u p p o s eu(x)=x.T h e n
X
x∈supp(L)
u(x)p
L(x)=1
1
3
+3
1
3
+5
1
3
=3
X
x∈supp(L0)
u(x)p
L0
(x)=1
3
4
+8
1
4
=
11
4
so that X
x∈supp(L)
u(x)p
L(x) >
X
x∈supp(L0)
u(x)p
L0
(x). (2.5)
However, the monotone transformation
b u(x)=
(
(u(x))
2 if u(x) ≥ 0
0 if u(x) < 0
screws up this ordering. For:
X
x∈supp(L)
b u(x)p
L(x)=( 1 )
2 1
3
+( 3 )
2 1
3
+( 5 )
2 1
3
=
35
3
' 11.67
X
x∈supp(L0)
b u(x)p
L0
(x)=( 1 )
2 3
4
+( 8 )
2 1
4
=
67
4
=1 6 .75
so that X
x∈supp(L)
b u(x)p
L(x) <
X
x∈supp(L0)
b u(x)p
L0
(x)
24which reverses the inequality (2.5).
This means that if we want to rank lotteries according to their expected utilities,
we can only allow positive linear transformations. Of course, f (u(x)) is still a utility
function on the set X of “sure” outcomes, but it does not allow us to compare lotteries.
2.4. Monotonicity
Throughout these notes we are assuming, for convenience, that X ⊆ Rn. In this setting
it is often natural to assume that the DM prefers larger vectors, i.e., for him “the more,
the better.” For this reason we introduced Monotonicity in Section 1. Its analog for
the more general set-up of this section is the following axiom:
B.4 MONOTONICITY: for any two vectors x1 and x2 in X,i fx1 >x 2,t h e nx1 Â x2.
This axiom looks the same as the one we used in section 1 (axiom A.3). However,
we have to remember that here x1 Â x2 stands for {x1,1}Â{ x2,1}.
If, on top of B.1, B.2,a n dB.3, we assume B.4 as well, the vN-M utility function
has the following simple property: For any two vectors x1 and x2 in X,i fx1 >x 2,t h e n
u(x
1) >u (x
2).
3. Monetary Lotteries
In the last section the choice set L was a very general object. However, in applications
lotteries with monetary outcomes play a major role. For example, ﬁnancial assets
are usually monetary lotteries. In this section we will explore some very interesting
properties of this class of lotteries.
Of course, as we will deal only with monetary lotteries, throughout the section
we have X = R. We do not restrict ourselves to R+ in order to also treat lotteries
that involve monetary losses (e.g.,
©
−3, 1
2;3, 1
3
ª
). Moreover, throughout the section we
assume that the DM’s preference ordering % satisﬁes all the axioms B.1, B.2, B.3,a n d
B.4. In particular, the Monotonicity axiom B.4 implies that the vN-M utility function
is strictly increasing, i.e.,
x>x
0 implies u(x) >u (x
0)
25for all monetary outcomes x and x0 in X. Of course, this is a very natural property;
in particular, it implies that u0 (x) > 0 for all x ∈ X.
3.1. Risk Attitudes
Simple casual observation suggests that people react quite diﬀerently to risk. Many
people do not like it, but, as the great success of casinos shows, there are also those
who enjoy it. For our purposes, attitudes toward risk are very important because they
greatly inﬂuence people’s decisions. Let us return to our example about government
bonds and Apple’s equities. We assumed that the bond pays for sure $5 at the end of
the year, while the equity pays a $1 dividend with probability 1
2,a n da$9 dividend
with probability 1
2. The following two lotteries describe the two ﬁnancial assets
{5,1} and
½
1,
1
2
;9,
1
2
¾
.
In the example the DM had to choose which asset to buy. Intuitively, a DM who dislikes
risk is going to prefer the government bond, which pays for sure $5, even though the
expected return of the Apple’s equity is also $5 (11
2 +9 1
2 =5 ) . B u tt h i si so n l ya n
expected value, and it might well turn out that the DM ends up with only $1.I t i s
the worst scenario that concerns a DM who dislikes risk. Of course, he could wind up
with $9, but he is focused on the worst alternative. Therefore, for such a DM we would
have
5 %
½
1,
1
2
;9,
1
2
¾
. (3.1)
Of course, if the DM likes risk, symmetric considerations lead to
½
1,
1
2
;9,
1
2
¾
% 5. (3.2)
In this case the DM focuses on the best equity scenario: he gets $9. It is very likely
that people who often go to casinos have such an attitude.
Finally, a DM who does not care about risk would have
5 ∼
½
1,
1
2
;9,
1
2
¾
. (3.3)
F o rh i m ,t oh a v eag i v e na m o u n to fm o n e yf o rs u r eo ri ne x p e c t e dv a l u ei si m m a t e r i a l .
Risk considerations do not aﬀect his decisions.
263.1.1. Expected Values
Before moving on, we have to make precise what we mean by expected values.
For a given lottery L =
©
x1,p L(x1);...;xn,p L(xn)
ª
, its expected value, denoted by
E(L),i st h en u m b e r
p
L(x
1)x
1 + ···+ p
L (x
n)x
n.
Equivalently, using the summation
P
,w eh a v eE(L)=
Pn
i=1 pL(xi)xi.
3.2. A Formal Approach to Risk Attitudes
T h ep r e v i o u ss i m p l ee x a m p l es h o w sv e r yc l e a r l yh o wi m p o r t a n ta r er i s ka t t i t u d e si n
people’s decisions. Fortunately, one of the most notable features of Expected Utility
Theory is that it allows a rigorous analysis of such attitudes. The ﬁr s ts t e pi nt h i s
analysis is a rigorous classiﬁcation (taxonomy) of risk attitudes. To this end, let us get
back to the example. There the DM had to choose among a risky asset L =
©
1, 1
2;9, 1
2
ª
and a risk-free asset which yields a sure $5, the expected value E(L) of the lottery L.
Consequently, we can rewrite (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) as, respectively,
E(L) % L, L % E(L),L ∼ E(L).
Therefore, the example suggests the following general classiﬁcation.
Deﬁnition 3.1. A DM is called risk averse if, for any lottery L in L, it holds that
E(L) % L.
He is called risk lover if
L % E(L),
and risk neutral if
L ∼ E(L).
In plain English, a risk averse DM prefers a sure outcome to any lottery whose
expected value equals such an outcome; the DM is a risk lover if the opposite is true;
ﬁnally, the DM is risk neutral if for him these two alternatives are equally attractive.
This is a neat deﬁnition. But one might wonder whether it is useful in applications.
Indeed, according to the deﬁnition to classify a DM as risk averse, lover, or neutral,
27we should go through all lotteries L in L and see how the DM ranks each L relative to
E(L). It is not enough to sample some lotteries, and check them. We must look at all
of them.
This seems a prohibitive task, and one could then doubt if the above classiﬁcation
is of any use. Fortunately, there is a very nice result, fundamental for all applications
of risk theory in economics, that makes the classiﬁcation operational.3
Theorem 3.2. A DM is risk averse if and only if his vN-M utility function is concave.
He is a risk lover if and only if his vN-M utility function is convex, and risk neutral if
and only if it is linear.
Proof. We prove the result for a risk averse DM. The argument for risk lover and
risk neutral DMs is similar. Suppose u is a concave vN-M utility function, and L =
©
x1,p L(x1);...;xn,p L(xn)
ª
. By Jensen’s inequality
u
Ã
n X
i=1
x
ip
L(x
i)
!
≥
n X
i=1
u
¡
x
i¢
p
L(x
i),
i.e.,
u(E(L)) ≥
n X
i=1
u
¡
x
i¢
p
L(x
i)
which, by the von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem, implies
E(L) % L.
This proves that the DM is risk averse.
To prove the converse, assume that the DM is risk averse. Let 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,a n dl e t
x and x0 be two monetary outcomes. Let us consider the lottery L = {x,λ;x0,1 − λ}.
By risk aversion,
λx +( 1− λ)x
0 = E(L) % L. (3.4)
By the von Neumann-Morgenstern Representation Theorem, (3.4) implies
u(λx +( 1− λ)x
0)=u(E(L)) ≥ λu(x)+( 1− λ)u(x
0)
a n dt h i sp r o v e st h a tu is concave. ¤
3The theorem makes use of concave functions. Thay are introduced in the Mathematical Appendix.
28The next ﬁgure illustrates the theorem for the simple portfolio example we have
considered before:
Figure 6 here.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h i st h e o r e m ,w en ol o n g e rh a v et oc h e c kl o t t e r yb yl o t t e r yt h eD M ’ s
preferences to determine his risk attitudes; we need only to know the shape of his vN-M
utility function. If it is concave, say u(x)=l gx, then we immediately know that he
is a risk averse DM. If it is convex, then he is a risk lover, and if it is linear, then he
is risk neutral. As checking concavity and convexity usually means checking just the
sign of second derivatives, all this is very convenient.
In sum, in risk theory convexity of the utility function reﬂects the presence of risk
aversion. As convexity is a very convenient property, it is quite remarkable that it is
possible to provide such an interesting behavioral foundation for its use.
3.3. Decreasing Risk Aversion
Among the risk attitudes we have considered, the one by far most studied in economics
is risk aversion. In fact, casual observation suggests that most people do not like risk.
Given its importance, in this subsection we will focus on this special risk attitude,
speciﬁcally, how risk aversion varies according to the DM’s wealth. This is a natural
and relevant question.
Intuitively, one might expect that, as monetary outcomes become smaller relative to
the DM’s overall wealth, his risk aversion becomes weaker. To make this intuition rigor-
ous we must take into account wealth in evaluating lotteries. In particular, if the DM’s
wealth is W, then he no longer considers the lottery L =
©
x1,p L(x1);...;xn,p L(xn)
ª
by itself, but the variations in his wealth that L entails. In particular, what matters
for him is the lottery
©
x
1 + W,p
L(x
1);...;x
n + W,p
L(x
n)
ª
(3.5)
in which the variations in wealth are recorded. Up to now, for simplicity’s sake, we
have overlooked the importance of the DM’s wealth in his choice among lotteries. This
is not a big deal as long as the monetary outcomes of the lotteries are negligible relative
to W. In such a case it is reasonable to expect that, being negligible, we can ignore
29the impact of the lotteries on the overall wealth W. But, if the outcomes are no longer
negligible, then we must take care of W. For example, ﬁnancial decisions usually
involve sizable amounts of money, and their impact on the DM’s wealth is exactly
their most important feature.
Notation. For convenience, we denote the lottery
©
x1 + W,pL(x1);...;xn + W,pL(xn)
ª
by LW.
At this point we can tackle the problem of how to formalize the intuition that risk
aversion diminishes as wealth increases. Suppose x is a sure monetary outcome, and L
a lottery in L.A s s u m et h a t
L
W Â W + x.
In this case, at the wealth level W the DM strictly prefers the lottery LW to the sure
alternative W + x.L e tf W>W .I fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h eD M ’ sw e a l t h ,t of W, causes him
to switch his ranking in favor of the sure outcome, i.e., f W +x % L
i W,t h e nh i sb e h a v i o r
is clearly displaying a more conservative attitude toward risk. It is therefore natural
to expect that a DM whose attitude toward risk does not become more conservative as
wealth increases, would, in contrast, keep his original ranking at the new higher wealth
level f W, i.e.,
L
i W Â f W + x.
This argument motivates the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 3.3. A DM is called decreasingly risk averse if, for all lotteries L in L,a l l
sure outcomes x in X, and all wealth’s levels W and f W,w i t hf W>W ,i th o l d st h a t
L
W Â W + x implies L
i W Â f W + x. (3.6)
Remark. I nas i m i l a rw a yi ti sp o s s i b l et od e ﬁne increasing risk aversion, as well as
constant risk aversion. In particular, a DM is increasingly risk averse whenever
L
i W Â f W + x implies L
W Â W + x,
and constantly risk averse whenever
L
W Â W + x if and only if L
i W Â f W + x.
30Like the deﬁnition of risk aversion, Deﬁnition 3.3 is very cumbersome to apply. In
fact, we must check the DM’s behavior for all lotteries L in L, all wealth levels W
and f W,a n da l lx.F o r t u n a t e l y ,a l s oi nt h i sc a s eav e r yi m p o r t a n tr e s u l tc h a r a c t e r i z e s
increasing risk aversion directly in terms of the vN-M utility function. For risk aversion
the relevant property of the vN-M utility function was concavity. Here, increasing risk
aversion is characterized by a property of ﬁrst and second derivatives.4
Theorem 3.4. A DM is decreasingly risk averse if and only if the function
λ(x)=−
u00(x)
u0(x)
is nonincreasing in x.5 The DM is increasingly risk averse if and only if λ(x) is nonde-
creasing, and constantly risk averse if and only if λ(x) is constant.
This theorem shows that, similarly to risk aversion, to check if a DM is decreasingly
risk averse requires only that we check a simple property of the vN-M utility function.
The function λ(x) is called the Arrow-Pratt measure of (absolute) risk aversion. It
was named after Kenneth Arrow and John Pratt, who discovered it in the 1960s and,
along with Bruno de Finetti, pioneered the study of risk attitudes.
Example. Suppose that u(x)=α + β lgx,w i t hβ>0 and x>0,i st h eD M ’ sv N - M
utility function. Then6
u
0(x)=
β
x
u
00(x)=−
β
x2
4In what follows we assume that such derivatives exist.
5Recall that a function f : R → R is nonincreasing if
f(x) ≤ f(x0) whenever x>x 0
for every pair of real numbers x and x0. For example, f(x)= 1
x is nonincreasing. Similarly, f : R → R
is nondecreasing if
f(x) ≥ f(x0) whenever x>x 0.
For example, f(x)=x2 is nondecreasing for x>0.
6The derivative of lgx is 1
x.
31so that
λ(x)=−
u00(x)
u0(x)
= −
−
β
x2
β
x
=
1
x
.
It is very easy to check that 1
x is nonincreasing. By the last theorem, this implies that
u(x)=α+β lgx,w i t hβ>0, is the vN-M utility function of a decreasingly risk averse
DM.
Example. Suppose that u(x)=α − βe−kx is the DM’s vN-M utility function, with
α,k ∈ R and β>0. Then,7
u
0(x)=βke
−kx
u
00(x)=−βk
2e
−kx
so that
λ(x)=−
u00(x)
u0(x)
= −
βk2e−kx
−βke−kx = k.
Therefore, λ(x)=k for all x in X.A sλ(x) is a constant function, by Theorem 3.4,
u(x)=α − βe−kx is the vN-M utility function of a constantly risk averse DM.
Example. Suppose that the DM has the quadratic vN-M utility function u(x)=
γ + αx − βx2,w i t hβ>0 and α,γ ∈ R. Then,
u
0(x)=α − 2βx
u
00(x)=−2β
so that
λ(x)=−
u00(x)
u0(x)
= −
−2β
α − 2βx
.
To see whether λ(·) is nondecreasing or nonincreasing, let us compute its ﬁrst deriva-
tive:
λ
0 (x)=
4β
2
(α − 2βx)
2.
We have λ
0 (x) > 0 for all x ∈ R,a n ds oλ(·) is nondecreasing. By Theorem 3.4,
u(x)=γ + αx − βx2 is the vN-M utility function of an increasingly risk averse DM.
7The derivative of ecx is cecx for any constant c in R.
32Since increasing risk aversion is not a very plausible behavioral property, this ﬁnding
actually casts serious doubts on the use of quadratic utility functions. This is an
important observation since quadratic utility functions are quite popular as they yield
expected utilities that depend only on the ﬁrst two moments of the lotteries, a feature
that makes them very convenient analytically. It is easy to see that only the ﬁrst two
moments matters with quadratic utilities. In fact:
X
x∈supp(L)
u(x)p
L(x)=
X
x∈supp(L)
¡
γ + αx − βx
2¢
p
L(x)
= γ
X
x∈supp(L)
p
L(x)+α
X
x∈supp(L)
xp
L(x) − β
X
x∈supp(L)
x
2p
L(x)
= γ + αE (L) − βE
¡
L
2¢
.
3.4. Few More Observations on Risk Aversion
We conclude this section with some important observations.
3.4.1. Constant Risk Aversion
By Theorem 3.2, a DM is risk neutral if and only if his vN-M utility function has the
form u(x)=αx + β,w i t hα>0 and β ∈ R. Since vN-M utility functions are unique
up to positive linear transformations, we can therefore say that, up to normalization,
a DM is risk neutral if and only if his vN-M utility function is u(x)=x. This means
that there is a unique risk neutral preference % on L, and it is such that the lotteries
are ranked according to their expected values, that is,
L % L
0 ⇐⇒
X
x∈supp(L)
xp
L(x) ≥
X
x∈supp(L0)
xp
L0
(x).
To say that two diﬀerent DMs are risk neutral is thus a meaningless statement since
risk neutrality uniquely identiﬁes a preference on L, common to all risk neutral DMs.
In contrast, there are many diﬀerent risk averse (risk loving) preferences, each corre-
sponding to a diﬀerent concave (convex) utility function. In this sense, risk neutrality
is a much stronger requirement than risk aversion or risk loving.
A similar phenomenon occurs for constant risk aversion. We have just seen how
the vN-M utility function u(x)=α − βekx exhibits constant (absolute) risk aversion.
33We now show that basically this is also the unique class of utility functions having this
property.
Proposition 3.5. A DM has constant risk aversion if and only if there exist constants
α ∈ R and β>0 such that
u(x)=
(
α − βe−λx if λ ≡ λ(x) 6=0
α + βx λ ≡ λ(x)=0
where λ(x) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion.
Hence, up to normalization, a DM has constant risk aversion if and only if his
vN-M utility function is either u(x)=e−kx for some k 6=0or u(x)=x (i.e., he is
risk neutral). This shows that besides risk neutral DMs, the only other DMs that have
constant risk aversion are those with exponential utility functions.
Proof. The “if” part is obvious (for λ 6=0is actually the second example of the
previous subsection). As to the “only if” part, suppose that the DM has constant risk
aversion. By Theorem 3.4, there is λ ∈ R such that λ(x)=λ for all x ∈ X. Suppose
ﬁrst that λ 6=0 .W e h a v e λ(x)=λ for all x ∈ X if and only if u00(x)+λu0 (x)=0
for all x ∈ X. This is a simple second order linear diﬀerential equation of the form
c1u00+c2u0 =0 ,w i t hc1,c 2 ∈ R. When the equation c1t2+c2t =0has real roots t1 and
t2, the general solution of this class of diﬀerential equations is u(x)=c1et1x + c2et2x.
In our special case, t1 =0and t2 = −λ. Hence, the general solution of u00 + λu0 =0is
u(x)=α+βe−λx with α,β ∈ R. Since we are only interested in monotone vN-M utility
functions, the solutions of interest for us have the form u(x)=α−βe−λx,w i t hα ∈ R
and β>0. This completes the proof for λ 6=0 .C o n s i d e rn o wλ =0 . By monotonicity,
u0 (x) > 0 for all x ∈ X,a n ds oλ(x)=0implies u00 (x)=0for all x ∈ X. Hence,
there exist constants α,β ∈ R such that u(x)=α + βx. By monotonicity, β>0. ¤
3.4.2. Maxmin and Extreme Risk Aversion (da scrivere)
Let ∆(X) be the set of all simple probabilities deﬁned on the consequence space X.
Proposition 3.6. Let % be a vN-M ordering on ∆(X). There exists a sequence
{%n}
∞
n=1 of vN-M orderings on ∆(X),w i t h%1=%, such that
34(i) all %n agree on X,
(ii) limn λn (x)=+ ∞ and λn (x) ≥ λn−1 (x) for all n ≥ 1 and all x ∈ X,
(iii) given any p and q in ∆(X), if eventually it holds p %n q,t h e n
min
x∈supp(p)
u(x) ≥ min
x∈supp(q)
u(x), (3.7)
while
min
x∈supp(p)
u(x) > min
x∈supp(q)
u(x) (3.8)
implies that eventually it holds p Ân q.
3.4.3. Beyond Risk Aversion
In the previous subsection we studied how risk aversion varies at diﬀerent levels of
wealth. In particular, we studied when a DM becomes more or less risk averse as his
wealth increases. Even though to ﬁx ideas we assumed that the DMs were already
risk averse, this is not really needed in the analysis. A moment’s reﬂection shows that
Deﬁnition 3.3 captures the comparative idea that a DM becomes “more risk averse” or
“less risk averse” as wealth increases, regardless of whether or not the DM is actually
r i s ka v e r s e . F o rar i s kl o v i n gD M ,b e i n gd e c r e a s i n gr i s ka v e r s ej u s tm e a n st h a th i s
risk loving attitude will become stronger as wealth increases. As a matter of fact,
“decreasing risk aversion” and “increasing risk love” are two faces of the same coin.
Not surprisingly therefore, Theorem 3.4 does not assume that the DM be risk averse,
namely that his vN-M utility function be concave. In fact, it still holds for risk loving
DMs.
Example. Consider again a DM with a quadratic vN-M utility function u(x)=
γ +αx−βx2,w h e r eα,γ ∈ R. Before we assumed β>0,a n ds ot h eD Mi sr i s ka v e r s e
since u(x) is concave when β>0.B u t , i f β<0,t h e nu(x) is convex, and so the
DM is risk loving. Since λ
0 (x)=4 β
2/(α − 2βx)2, λ(x) is an increasing function. By
Theorem 3.4, u(x)=γ +αx−βx2 is the vN-M utility function of an increasingly risk
averse DM. In particular, when β>0, the DM is risk averse, and having an increasing
risk aversion means that his risk aversion increases as wealth increases; when β<0,
the DM is risk loving, and having an increasing risk aversion means that his risk love
decreases as wealth increases.
354. A Portfolio Problem.
In this section we apply what we have learned about risk attitudes to a simple portfolio
problem.
Suppose a strictly risk averse DM8 has to choose how to allocate his wealth W
among two assets. The ﬁrst one is a risk-free asset which at the end of the year will
pay a sure R>1 dollars per each dollar invested. The other asset is risky and can be
represented by the following lottery L
©
x
1,p
L(x
1);...;x
n,p
L(x
n)
ª
.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n,e a c hxi represents the gross return9 that, with probability pL(xi),t h e
DM earns at the end of the year per each dollar invested. The example we have used
b e f o r ew i t hg o v e r n m e n tb o n d sa n dA p p l e ’ se q u i t i e si sas p e c i a lc a s eo ft h i sp o r t f o l i o
problem.
We denote by 0 ≤ α ≤ W the amount of money the DM invests in the risky asset.
If xi obtains, at the end of the year the result of the DM’s investment would be
αx
i + R(W − α).
Therefore, the following lottery represents his overall investment
©
αx
1 + R(W − α),p
L(x
1);...;αx
2 + R(W − α),p
L(x
n)
ª
and, consequently, the DM’s expected utility of his investment is
n X
i=1
u
¡
αx
i + R(W − α)
¢
p
L(x
i). (4.1)
The DM’s problem is how to choose α in order to maximize the expected utility
(4.1), that is,
max
α
n X
i=1
u
¡
αx
i + R(W − α)
¢
p
L(x
i). (4.2)
We consider two cases.
8Which means that his vN-M utility function is strictly concave.
9The gross return is the amount the asset pays back for each dollar invested.
364.1. Case 1: E(L) ≤ R
Suppose E(L) ≤ R, i.e. the expected gross return of the risky asset is not greater than
that of the risk-free asset. If this is the case, it is reasonable to expect that the optimal
choice is α =0 : a risk averse DM invests all his money in the risk-free asset. We
now prove formally that this intuition is correct. Actually, we prove something more:
E(L) ≤ R i st h eo n l yc a s ew h e nα =0is the optimal choice.
Theorem 4.1. The optimal choice is α =0if and only if E(L) ≤ R.
Proof. “If” part. Suppose that E(L) ≤ R. We want to show that α =0is optimal.
As u is strictly concave, by Jensen’s inequality
n X
i=1
u
¡
αx
i + R(W − α)
¢
p
L(x
i) <u
Ã
n X
i=1
¡
αx
i + R(W − α)
¢
p
L(x
i)
!
(4.3)
= u(α(E(L) − R)+RW)
Since E(L) ≤ R and u is monotonic, if α>0 then
u(α(E(L) − R)+RW) ≤ u(RW)
because α(E(L) − R) ≤ 0. Together with (4.3) this implies
n X
i=1
u
¡
αx
i + R(W − α)
¢
p
L(x
i) <u (RW) for all α>0.
Therefore, α =0is the optimal choice since, for α =0 , the expected utility
Pn
i=1 u(αxi + R(W − α))pL(xi) reduces to u(RW).
“Only if” part. Suppose that α =0is the optimal choice. We want to show that
E(L) ≤ R. The derivative with respect to α of the expected utility
Pn
i=1 u(αxi + R(W − α))pL(xi)
is
n X
i=1
¡
x
i − R
¢
u
0 ¡
αx
i + R(W − α)
¢
p
L(x
i).
At α =0 , this derivative becomes
Pn
i=1 (xi − R)u0 (RW)pL(xi). Since α =0is a
boundary solution10 for the maximization problem (4.2), by Theorem 6.20 it holds
that
n X
i=1
¡
x
i − R
¢
u
0 (RW)p
L(x
i) ≤ 0.
10α =0is a boundary value for α because we assumed that 0 ≤ α ≤ W.
37Therefore,
u
0 (RW)(E (L) − R)=
n X
i=1
¡
x
i − R
¢
u
0 (RW)p
L(x
i) ≤ 0. (4.4)
Since u0 (RW) > 0 by the monotonicity of u, (4.4) implies
E (L) − R ≤ 0;
that is, E (L) ≤ R,a sw a n t e d .¤
4.2. Case 2: E(L) >R
Suppose E(L) >R , that is, the expected gross return of the risky asset is greater
than that of the risk-free asset. By Theorem 4.1, in this case the optimal value of α
will be greater than 0:t h a ti s ,t h eD Md i v e r s i ﬁes his portfolio in the two assets. The
most interesting question to answer here is how the optimal value of α varies as the
wealth W varies. Intuitively, a DM with decreasing risk aversion should move a larger
proportion of W to the risky asset as W increases. In other words, the risky asset
should be a normal good for a decreasingly risk averse DM: the higher the wealth, the
more he buys the risky asset.
We now show that such an intuition is correct. In particular, we prove the following
neat result.
Theorem 4.2. The optimal amount α allocated to the risky asset nondecreases11 as
W increases if the DM is decreasingly risk averse. The amount α nonincreases if the
DM is increasingly risk averse, and α remains constant if the DM is constantly risk
averse.
This beautiful result, due to Kenneth Arrow, shows that the notions of risk aversion
and increasing risk aversion we have studied are very useful for understanding the DM’s
behavior. Indeed, they completely characterize his decision.
The ﬁrst step in proving the theorem is to observe that for each wealth level W
there exists a unique optimal portfolio allocation α.
11In Theorem 3.4 we have seen that a decreasingly risk averse DM is characterized by a nonincreasing
Arrow-Pratt measure λ(x). We can call a DM strictly decreasing risk averse if λ(x) is decreasing. For
such a DM the amount α increases as W increases. Of course, in a similar vein we can introduce strict
increasing risk aversion, and have α increase as W increases.
38Lemma 4.3. For each W there exists a unique optimal amount α, denoted by α(W).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exist two optimal allocations α(W) and
e α(W),w i t hα(W) 6= e α(W).A st h e ya r eb o t ho p t i m a l ,w eh a v e
n X
i=1
u
¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢
p
L(x
i)=
n X
i=1
u
¡
e α(W)x
i + R(W − e α(W))
¢
p
L(x
i)
otherwise one of the two would be better than the other. Set
b α(W)=tα(W)+( 1− t)e α(W) with 0 ≤ t ≤ 1,
and notice that for each 0 ≤ α ≤ W, it holds that αxi+R(W −α)=α(xi − R)+RW.
By strict concavity of u,w eh a v e
n X
i=1
u
¡
b α(W)x
i + R(W − b α(W))
¢
p
L(x
i)
=
n X
i=1
u
¡
tα(W)
¡
x
i − R
¢
+( 1− t)e α(W)
¡
x
i − R
¢
+ RW
¢
p
L(x
i)
=
n X
i=1
u
¡
tα(W)
¡
x
i − R
¢
+( 1− t)e α(W)
¡
x
i − R
¢
+ tRW +( 1− t)RW
¢
p
L(x
i)
=
n X
i=1
u
¡
t
£
α(W)
¡
x
i − R
¢
+ RW
¤
+( 1− t)
£
e α(W)
¡
x
i − R
¢
+ RW
¤¢
p
L(x
i)
>t
n X
i=1
u
¡
α(W)
¡
x
i − R
¢
+ RW
¢
+( 1− t)
n X
i=1
u
¡
e α(W)
¡
x
i − R
¢
+ RW
¢
p
L(x
i)
=
n X
i=1
u
¡
α(W)
¡
x
i − R
¢
+ RW
¢
p
L(x
i)=
n X
i=1
u
¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢
p
L(x
i)
Therefore,
n X
i=1
u
¡
b α(W)x
i + R(W − b α(W))
¢
p
L(x
i) >
n X
i=1
u
¡
α(W)
¡
x
i − R
¢
+ RW
¢
p
L(x
i).
This obviously contradicts the optimality of α(W).W ec o n c l u d et h a tα(W)=e α(W),
i . e . ,t h e r ei sau n i q u eo p t i m a lv a l u eo fα. ¤
39Proof of Theorem 4.2. Since for each W there is a unique optimal allocation, α(W) is
a function. By Theorem 4.1 we know that 0 <α (W) ≤ W. For convenience, we assume
that the function α(W) is diﬀerentiable (i.e., α0(W) exists) and that 0 <α (W) <W
for all W (i.e., it is never optimal to put all wealth in the risky asset).
Since α(W) ∈ (0,W), α(W) is an interior solution so that α(W) satisﬁes the ﬁrst
order condition of the maximization problem (4.2), which is
n X
i=1
¡
x
i − R
¢
u
0 ¡
αx
i + R(W − α)
¢
p
L(x
i)=0 . (4.5)
Therefore,
n X
i=1
¡
x
i − R
¢
u
0 ¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢
p
L(x
i)=0 for each W ≥ 0. (4.6)
We wish to study the behavior of α(W). In order to do this, we diﬀerentiate relative
to W this last expression, and we get
n X
i=1
¡
x
i − R
¢¡
α
0(W)
¡
x
i − R
¢
+ R
¢
u
00¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢
p
L(x
i)=0 .
Rearranging the terms we get
α
0(W)=−
R
Pn
i=1 (xi − R)u00 (α(W)xi + R(W − α(W)))pL(xi)
Pn
i=1 (xi − R)
2 u00 (α(W)xi + R(W − α(W)))pL(xi)
.
Since u is strictly concave, u00 < 0 and the denominator is strictly negative. Therefore,
the sign of α0(W) is equal to that of the numerator, i.e., α0(W) ≥ 0 if and only if12
R
n X
i=1
¡
x
i − R
¢
u
00 ¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢
p
L(x
i) ≥ 0. (4.7)
12Notice that α(W) <Wimplies that at least for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n it holds that xi <Rso that
the inequality in (4.7) is meaningful. Instead, if it held that xi ≥ R for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then, with
E(L) >R , for at least some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we would have xi >Rand, consequently,
R
n X
i=1
¡
xi − R
¢
u00 ¡
α(W)xi + R(W − α(W))
¢
pL(xi) < 0
which, in turn, would imply that the inequality in (4.7) never holds. But, since α(W) <W ,t h i s
cannot happen and the inequality in (4.7) is meaningful.
40By deﬁnition,
λ
¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢
= −
u00 (α(W)xi + R(W − α(W)))
u0 (α(W)xi + R(W − α(W)))
. (4.8)
Since the DM is decreasingly risk averse, by Theorem 3.4 the function λ(·) is nonin-
creasing. We now consider two cases:
1. Suppose xi ≥ R.T h e n
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W)) = α(W)
¡
x
i − R
¢
+ RW ≥ RW
and so
λ
¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢
≤ λ(RW).
By (4.8), this implies
−
u00 (α(W)xi + R(W − α(W)))
u0 (α(W)xi + R(W − α(W)))
≤ λ(RW)
so that
u
00 ¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢
≥− λ(RW)u
0 ¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢
.
As (xi − R) ≥ 0, we can multiply both sides by (xi − R):
u
00 ¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢¡
x
i − R
¢
≥− λ(RW)
¡
x
i − R
¢
u
0 ¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢
2. Suppose now xi <R .T h e n
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W)) = α(W)
¡
x
i − R
¢
+ RW ≤ RW
Then
λ
¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢
≥ λ(RW).
By (4.8), this implies
−
u00 (α(W)xi + R(W − α(W)))
u0 (α(W)xi + R(W − α(W)))
≥ λ(RW)
41so that
u
00 ¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢
≤− λ(RW)u
0 ¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢
.
As (xi − R) < 0, if we multiply both sides by (xi − R) we get
u
00 ¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢¡
x
i − R
¢
(4.9)
≥− λ(RW)
¡
x
i − R
¢
u
0 ¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢
.
In sum, in both cases we end up with the inequality (4.9). Multiplying all these
terms by their respective probabilities we get:
n X
i=1
u
00 ¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢¡
x
i − R
¢
p
L(x
i)
≥− λ(RW)
n X
i=1
¡
x
i − R
¢
u
0 ¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢
p
L(x
i).
But the ﬁrst order condition (4.6) was
n X
i=1
¡
x
i − R
¢
u
0 ¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢
p
L(x
i)=0
so that
n X
i=1
u
00¡
α(W)x
i + R(W − α(W))
¢¡
x
i − R
¢
p
L(x
i) ≥ 0.
By (4.7), this implies α0(W) ≥ 0,s ot h a tα0(W) is a nondecreasing function. This
completes the proof for decreasing risk aversion. The arguments for increasing risk
aversion is similar, while that for constant risk aversion is left to the reader. ¤
5. Comparing Risk Aversions
As casual observation reveals, risk attitudes vary across people. In particular, limiting
ourselves to risk averters, some people display more risk aversion than others. These
diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion greatly aﬀect people’s decisions in risky situations. It
is therefore natural to look for a rigorous way to compare the degree of risk aversion
among DMs. This is the subject of this section.13
13To ﬁx ideas, it might be useful to assume that theD M sa r er i s ka v e r s e .B u t ,a si tw a st h ec a s e
before for the analyis of decreasing risk aversion, the results of this section apply to risk lovers as well.
42The ﬁrst order of business is to provide an interesting behavioral characterization
o ft h es t a t e m e n t“ t h i sD Mi sm o r er i s ka v e r s et h a nt h a to n e . ”L e tD M 1 and DM2 be
two decision makers whose preference orderings on L are, respectively, %1and %2.L e t
x be a sure outcome in X,a n dL be a lottery in L. Suppose
L %1 x,
that is, DM1 (weakly) prefers the lottery to the sure outcome. If DM1 is at least as
risk averse as DM2 it is natural to expect that for him as well it holds that
L %2 x.
In other words, if DM1 is bold enough to have L %1 x,t h e nD M 2, who dislikes risk no
more than DM1 does, must be at least equally bold.
We take this as the behavioral characterization of the statement “this DM is more
risk averse than that one.” More formally
Deﬁnition 5.1. DM1 is at least as risk averse as DM2 if, for all x in X and L in L
such that
L %1 x, (5.1)
it holds that
L %2 x.
Like Deﬁnitions 3.1 and 3.3, also Deﬁnition 5.1 is very hard to check as we should
record the DMs behavior for all lotteries L and sure outcomes x for which (5.1) holds.
Fortunately, also in this case it is possible to provide a more operational characteri-
zation. To this end, let us return to Theorem 3.2, which showed that risk aversion
is characterized by the concavity of the vN-M utility function. This result suggested
that the degree of risk aversion should be tied to the “degree” of convexity of vN-M
utility function. In particular, one may suspect that the more concave the vN-M utility
function, the more risk averse the DM. The next result shows that this is the case.
Theorem 5.2. DM1 is at least as risk averse as DM2 if and only if there exists a
strictly increasing concave function g : u2 (X) → R such that
u1(x)=g(u2(x)) for all x in X. (5.2)
43Proof. “If”. Suppose (5.2) holds and let L %1 x for some L ∈ L and x ∈ X.B y( 5 . 2 ) ,
we have:
L %1 x ⇐⇒
X
x∈supp(L)
u1 (x)p
L(x) ≥ u1 (x) ⇐⇒
X
x∈supp(L)
g(u2(x))p
L(x) ≥ g(u2(x))(x).
By the Jensen inequality,
g


X
x∈supp(L)
u2(x)p
L (x)

 ≥
X
x∈supp(L)
g(u2(x))p
L(x) ≥ g(u2(x))(x),
and so X
x∈supp(L)
u2(x)p
L(x) ≥ u2(x)(x)
since g is strictly increasing. We conclude that L %1 x implies L %2 x, as desired.
“Only if”. Set g(x)=
¡
u1 ◦ u
−1
2
¢
(x) for all x ∈ X.S i n c eu2 is strictly increasing,
its inverse u
−1
2 as well is strictly increasing, and so the function g is strictly increasing.
Moreover, since it holds
¡
u
−1
1 ◦ u1
¢
(x)=x =
¡
u
−1
2 ◦ u2
¢
(x)
for all x ∈ X,w eh a v e
u1 (x)=
¡
u1 ◦
¡
u
−1
2 ◦ u2
¢¢
(x)=
¡¡
u1 ◦ u
−1
2
¢
◦ u2
¢
(x)=( g ◦ u2)(x)
for all x ∈ X.
In sum, u1 = g ◦ u2. It remains to show that g is concave. By Deﬁnition 5.1,
X
x∈supp(L)
u1 (x)p
L (x) ≥ u1 (x)= ⇒
X
x∈supp(L)
u2 (x)p
L(x) ≥ u2 (x) (5.3)
for all x ∈ X.S i n c e X is an interval, given any L there exists xL ∈ X such that
P
x∈supp(L) u1 (x)pL (x)=u1 (xL). Hence, by Eq. (5.3),
P
x∈supp(L) u2 (x)pL (x) ≥
u2 (xL).S i n c eu
−1
2 is strictly increasing, in turn this implies that, for all lotteries L,
u
−1
2


X
x∈supp(L)
u2 (x)p
L(x)


≥ u
−1
2 (u2 (xL)) = xL =
¡
u
−1
1 ◦ u1
¢
(xL)=u
−1
1


X
x∈supp(L)
u1 (x)p
L (x)

.
44Since u1 is strictly increasing, this implies:
g


X
x∈supp(L)
u2 (x)p
L(x)

 = u1

u
−1
2


X
x∈supp(L)
u2 (x)p
L (x)



 (5.4)
≥ u1

u
−1
1


X
x∈supp(L)
u1 (x)p
L (x)




=
X
x∈supp(L)
u1 (x)p
L(x)=
X
x∈supp(L)
(g ◦ u2)p
L (x).
Now, let λ ∈ (0,1) and let y,y0 ∈ u2 (X). By the deﬁnition of u2 (X),t h e r ee x i s t
x,x0 ∈ X such that u(x)=y and u(x0)=y0. As in the proof of Theorem 3.2 consider
the lottery L = {x,λ;x0,1 − λ}. For this lottery Eq. (5.4) reduces to
g(λy +( 1− λ)y
0)=g(λu2 (x)+( 1− λ)u2 (x
0))
≥ λg (u2 (x)) + (1 − λ)g(u2 (x
0)) = λg(y)+( 1− λ)g(y
0).
Since this holds for any λ ∈ (0,1) and any pair y,y0 ∈ u2 (X), we conclude that g is
concave on u2 (X), as desired.
This result shows that DM1 has a more concave vN-M utility function than DM2,
and it is the analog of Theorem 3.2.
Given u1 and u2 it may be quite cumbersome to check if such a function g exists.
However, as the following result shows, it suﬃces to compare the Arrow-Pratt measures
of risk aversion. This is very convenient since calculating these measures requires only
ﬁrst and second derivatives.
Theorem 5.3. Let u1 and u2 be twice diﬀerentiable. Then, there exists a diﬀerentiable
and strictly increasing concave function g : u2 (X) → R such that
u1(x)=g(u2(x)) for all x in X
if and only if λ1(x) ≥ λ2(x) for all x in X.
Proof. “Only if” part: suppose there exists a diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing
concave function g : u2 (X) → R such that u1(x)=g(u2(x)) for all x ∈ X.B y t h e
45Chain Rule,
u
0
1 (x)=g
0 (u2 (x))u
0
2 (x), (5.5)
u
00
1 (x)=g
00 (u2 (x))u
0
2 (x)
2 + u
00
2 (x)g
0 (u2 (x)).
Hence,
λ1 (x)=−
u00
1 (x)
u0
1 (x)
= −
g00(u2 (x))u0
2 (x)
2 + u00
2 (x)g0 (u2 (x))
u0
1 (x)
= −
g00 (u2 (x))u0
2 (x)
2
u0
1 (x)
+λ2 (x),
which implies,
(λ2 (x) − λ1 (x))
u0
1 (x)
u0
2 (x)
2 = g
00 (u2 (x)). (5.6)
Since g is concave, g00(u2 (x)) ≤ 0,w h i l eu0
1 (x)/u0
2 (x)
2 ≥ 0 since u1 is strictly increas-
ing. We conclude that λ2 (x) ≤ λ1 (x).
As to the converse, assume that λ1(x) ≥ λ2(x) for all x in X.A si nt h ep r o o fo fT h e -
orem 5.2, set g(x)=
¡
u1 ◦ u
−1
2
¢
(x) for all x ∈ X.S i n c eu2 is strictly increasing and dif-
ferentiable, the inverse as well is diﬀerentiable and we have
¡
u
−1
2
¢0 (y)=1 /u0
2
¡
u
−1
2 (y)
¢
.
Since u2 is concave, its inverse is twice diﬀerentiable (dimostrarlo).
Since u1 = g ◦ u2 and g is twice diﬀerentiable, Eqs. (5.5) and (5.6) hold. In
particular, by (5.5) we have g0 > 0 on u2 (X),w h i l eb y( 5 . 6 )w eh a v et h a tλ1(x) ≥ λ2(x)
for all x in X implies g00 ≤ 0 on u2 (X).W ec o n c l u d et h a tg is strictly increasing and
concave on u2 (X).
Therefore, the Arrow-Pratt measure plays two diﬀerent roles:
1. For a single DM it tells us whether the DM is increasingly, decreasingly or con-
stantly risk averse.
2 .G i v e nt w oD M s ,i tt e l l su sw h e t h e ro n ei sm o r er i s ka v e r s et h a nt h eo t h e r .
5.1. The Portfolio Problem Revisited
We now apply these results to the portfolio problem we studied in the previous section.
Intuitively, one expects that a more risk averse DM will be less willing to invest his
money in the risky asset. The next result formally proves that such an intuition is
correct. Like Theorem 4.2, the next result is due to Kenneth Arrow.
46Theorem 5.4. Let b α1 and b α2 be the optimal amount of money that, respectively,
DM1 and DM2 invest in the risky asset. If DM2 is at least as risk averse as DM1,t h e n
b α1 ≥ b α2.
Proof. If E (L) ≤ R,t h e nb α1 = b α2 =0by Theorem 4.1 and we are done. Suppose,
instead, that E (L) >R .B o t hb α1 and b α2 satisfy the ﬁrst order condition (4.5); that
is,
n X
i=1
¡
x
i − R
¢
u
0
1
¡
b α1x
i + R(W − b α1)
¢
p
L(x
i)=0 . (5.7)
and
n X
i=1
¡
x
i − R
¢
u
0
2
¡
b α2x
i + R(W − b α2)
¢
p
L(x
i)=0 . (5.8)
Deﬁne the function φ : R → R as follows:
φ(α)=
n X
i=1
¡
x
i − R
¢
u
0
2
¡
αx
i + R(W − α)
¢
p
L(x
i) (5.9)
for all α ∈ R. Clearly, (5.8) implies that φ(b α2)=0 .B yd i ﬀerentiating φ with respect
to α, we get
φ
0 (α)=
n X
i=1
¡
x
i − R
¢¡
x
i − R
¢
u
00
2
¡
αx
i + R(W − α)
¢
p
L(x
i)
=
n X
i=1
¡
x
i − R
¢2 u
00
2
¡
αx
i + R(W − α)
¢
p
L(x
i) < 0
because strict concavity of u2 implies u00
2 < 0 (see Theorem 6.12 (ii)). Since φ
0 (α) < 0,
φ is a strictly decreasing function. We want to show that φ(b α1) ≤ 0.I nf a c t ,s i n c eφ
is a strictly decreasing function, φ(b α1) ≤ 0 and φ(b α2)=0imply that b α1 ≥ b α2.
Therefore, to complete the proof we have to show that φ(b α1) ≤ 0. This is the
purpose of the rest of the proof. By Theorem 5.2, we have u2(x)=g(u1(x)) for all x
in X, so that we can rewrite (5.9) as follows:
φ(α)=
n X
i=1
¡
x
i − R
¢
g
0 ¡
u1
¡
αx
i + R(W − α)
¢¢
u
0
1
¡
αx
i + R(W − α)
¢
p
L(x
i).
47Deﬁne the two functions f and e f as follows:
f
¡
x
i¢
=
¡
x
i − R
¢
u
0
1
¡
b α1x
i + R(W − b α1)
¢
e f
¡
x
i¢
= g
0 ¡
u1
¡
b α1x
i + R(W − b α1)
¢¢
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, so that
φ(b α1)=
n X
i=1
e f
¡
x
i¢
f
¡
x
i¢
p
L(x
i).
Since g is increasing and concave, g0 > 0 and g00 ≤ 0,a n ds ot h a tg0 is a positive
decreasing function. Therefore, e f (xi) > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
e f
¡
x
i¢
≥ e f
³
x
i0´
if x
i <x
i0
(5.10)
for all 1 ≤ i,i0 ≤ n. Moreover, since u0
1 > 0,i th o l d st h a t
f
¡
x
i¢
≤ 0 if x
i ≤ R and f
¡
x
i¢
≥ 0 if x
i ≥ R. (5.11)
Let I1 = {i : xi ≥ R} and I2 = {i : xi <R }. By (5.10),
e f
¡
x
i¢
≤ e f
³
x
i0´
whenever i ∈ I1 and i ∈ I2,
so that
max
i∈I1
e f
¡
x
i¢
≤ min
i∈I2
e f
¡
x
i¢
. (5.12)
By (5.7),
Pn
i=1 f (xi)pL(xi)=0 .T h e r e f o r e
φ(b α1)=
n X
i=1
e f
¡
x
i¢
f
¡
x
i¢
p
L(x
i)
≤
X
i∈I1
µ
max
i∈I1
e f
¡
x
i¢¶
f
¡
x
i¢
p
L(x
i)+
X
i∈I2
µ
min
i∈I2
e f
¡
x
i¢¶
f
¡
x
i¢
p
L(x
i)
=m a x
i∈I1
e f
¡
x
i¢X
i∈I1
f
¡
x
i¢
p
L(x
i)+m i n
i∈I2
e f
¡
x
i¢X
i∈I2
f
¡
x
i¢
p
L(x
i)
≤ min
i∈I2
e f
¡
x
i¢X
i∈I1
f
¡
x
i¢
p
L(x
i)+m i n
i∈I2
e f
¡
x
i¢X
i∈I2
f
¡
x
i¢
p
L(x
i)
=m i n
i∈I2
e f
¡
x
i¢
Ã
X
i∈I1
f
¡
x
i¢
p
L(x
i)+
X
i∈I2
f
¡
x
i¢
p
L(x
i)
!
=m i n
i∈I2
e f
¡
x
i¢
n X
i=1
f
¡
x
i¢
p
L(x
i)=0 .
We conclude that φ(b α1) ≤ 0,a sw a n t e d .¤
486. Mathematical Appendix
6.1. Real Numbers
Let R be the set of all real numbers. On R there are three classic elementary relations:
the weak inequality ≥, the strict inequality >, and the equality =. In particular, the
relations > and = can be deﬁned in terms of ≥ in the following way:
1. for any two real numbers x and x0,w ew r i t e
x>x
0
if x ≥ x0, but not x0 ≥ x;
2. for any two real numbers x and x0,w ew r i t e
x = x
0
if both x ≥ x0 and x0 ≥ x.
Example. Let us consider the two real numbers 3 and 4. We clearly have 4 > 3.
Indeed, it holds that 4 ≥ 3,b u tn o t3 ≥ 4.
These relations have the following basic properties:
P.1 for any x,x0 ∈ R, x ≥ x0 and x0 ≥ x hold if and only if x = x0;
P.2 for any x,x0 ∈ R,e i t h e rx ≥ x0 or x0 ≥ x or both (i.e., x = x0);
P.3 for any x,x0 ∈ R,e i t h e rx>x 0 or x0 >xor x = x0;
P.4 for any x,x0 ∈ R, x>x 0 implies x ≥ x0;
P.5 for any x,x0 ∈ R, x = x0 implies x ≥ x0.
Similar relations exist in the space Rn of all n-dimensional vectors x =( x1,...,x n),
but some subtleties are involved in this more general case.
49The deﬁnition of the equality = in Rn is straightforward: given any two vectors
x =( x1,...,xn) and x0 =( x0
1,...,x 0
n) in Rn,w es a yt h a tx = x0 if
x1 = x
0
1,x 2 = x
0
2,...,xn = x
0
n
that is, two vectors are equal if all their coordinates are equal.
More subtle is the case of the inequalities. In Rn there are three inequalities: ≥,
>,a n d>>.
Deﬁnition 6.1. Given any two vectors x =( x1,...,xn) and x0 =( x0
1,...,x0
n) in Rn,w e
say that x ≥ x0 if for all coordinates 1 ≤ i ≤ n it holds that xi ≥ x0
i.
Example. Let n =3 , x =( 3 ,3,4),a n dx0 =( 3 ,2,4).T h e n ,x ≥ x0.I fx00 =( 3 ,3,4),
then x ≥ x00.
As the example suggests, also in Rn we have x = x0 if and only if x ≥ x0 and x0 ≥ x.
Deﬁnition 6.2. Given any two vectors x =( x1,...,xn) and x0 =( x0
1,...,x0
n) in Rn,w e
say that x>x 0 if:
1. for all coordinates 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it holds that xi ≥ x0
i,
2. for at least one coordinate 1 ≤ i ≤ n,i th o l d st h a txi >x 0
i.
Example. Let n =3 , x =( 3 ,3,4),a n dx0 =( 3 ,2,4). Then, x>x 0.I nf a c t :
1. for all coordinates 1 ≤ i ≤ n,i th o l d st h a txi ≥ x0
i: x1 =3≥ x0
1 =3 , x2 =3≥
x0
2 =2 ,a n dx3 =4≥ x0
3 =4 ;
2 .f o ra tl e a s to n ec o o r d i n a t e1 ≤ i ≤ n,i th o l d st h a txi >x 0
i:f o ri =2we have
x2 =3>x 0
2 =2 .
Finally, we introduce the inequality >>.
Deﬁnition 6.3. Given any two vectors x =( x1,...,xn) and x0 =( x0
1,...,x0
n) in Rn,w e
say that x> >x 0 if for all coordinates 1 ≤ i ≤ n,i th o l d st h a txi >x 0
i.
50Example. Let n =3 , x =( 3 ,3,4),a n dx0 =( 2 ,1,1). Then, x>x 0.I n f a c t ,
x1 =3>x 0
1 =2 , x2 =3>x 0
2 =1 ,a n dx3 =4>x 0
3 =1 .
In R the two relations > and >> clearly coincide. Therefore, the distinction between
> and >> is relevant only for Rn, n ≥ 2. The following simple properties hold:
P.6 for any x,x0 ∈ Rn,w eh a v ex ≥ x0 and x0 ≥ x if and only if x = x0;
P.7 for any x,x0 ∈ Rn, x> >x 0 implies x ≥ x0;
P.8 for any x,x0 ∈ Rn, x>x 0 implies x ≥ x0;
P.9 for any x,x0 ∈ Rn, x = x0 implies x ≥ x0.
Clearly, P.1, P.4,a n dP.5 are, respectively, special cases of P.6, P.8,a n dP.9 for
n =1 .
I ti sv e r yi m p o r t a n tt on o t i c et h a ti nRn,f o rn ≥ 2, the properties P.2 and P.3 fail,
that is, there are vectors that cannot be compared through any of the above relations.
For example, let x =( 3 ,3,4) and x0 =( 4 ,1,1).W e h a v e x0
1 >x 1, but x2 >x 0
2 and
x3 >x 0
3. Hence, none of the relations =, ≥, >, >> holds among these two vectors x
and x0.
We conclude this subsection by stating the important Archimedean property.14
Theorem 6.4. (Archimedean Property). Let x,x0, and x00 be any three real num-
bers in R such that x>x 0 >x 00. There exist two real numbers 0 <α<1 and
0 <β<1 such that
αx +( 1− α)x
00 >x
0 >β x+( 1− β)x
00.
Proof. Omitted. ¤
Example. Let x =5 , x0 =3 ,a n dx00 =1 .S e tα = 3
4 and β = 1
3.T h e n
αx +( 1− α)x
00 =4>x
0 =3>β x+( 1− β)x
00 =
7
3
.
14This property is named after Archimedes (287 BC - 212 BC), the famous mathematician and
physicist of Syracuse, an important Greek colony in Sicily.
516.2. Convergence and Continuity
Let {x1,x 2,...,xk,...} be an inﬁnite sequence of real numbers, denoted by {xk}
∞
k=1.
Some examples of inﬁnite sequences are:
1. the sequence of odd numbers {1,3,5,7,...,2k +1 ,...};
2. the sequence of fractions with odd numbers as denominators
©
1, 1
3, 1
5, 1
7,..., 1
2k+1,...
ª
;
3. the sequence
n
1,
q
1
3,
q
1
5,
q
1
7,...,
q
1
2k+1,...
o
;
4. the sequence
©
1, 1
4, 1
16,..., 1
k2,...
ª
.
A sequence of real numbers {xk}
∞
k=1 is said to converge to a real number x if, as k
goes to inﬁnity, the elements xk move closer and closer to x.
Formally:
Deﬁnition 6.5. The sequence {xk}
∞
k=1 of real numbers converges to x if for every
positive quantity ε, as small as wanted, there exists a positive integer K such that, for
all k ≥ K, it holds that
x − ε ≤ xk ≤ x + ε.
We call x the limit of the sequence and we write limk xk = x.
For example, the sequence
©
1, 1
3, 1
5, 1
7,..., 1
2k+1,...
ª
converges to 0.
Not all sequences converge. The sequence {1,3,5,7,...,2k +1 ,...} diverges to inﬁn-
ity. A more interesting example is the sequence {−1,1,−1,1,−1,...,(−1)k,...},w h i c h
does not converge to any number as it keeps oscillating between 1 and −1.
The deﬁnition of convergence is readily extended to vectors. Let
©
xkª∞
k=1 be an
inﬁnite sequence of vectors in Rn. Each vector xk can be written as xk =
©
xk
1,...,xk
n
ª
,
where the superscript denotes the vector and the subscripts its coordinates.
Deﬁnition 6.6. We say that
©
xkª∞
k=1 converges to the vector x if and only if, for each
1 ≤ i ≤ n, the coordinate sequence
©
xk
i
ª∞
k=1 converges to the coordinate xi.W ec a l lx
the limit of the sequence and we write limk→∞ xk = x.
The ﬁnal notion to be introduced is that of continuity of a function. Intuitively, a
function is continuous if one can draw its graph without lifting the pen. Formally, we
have the following deﬁnition.
52Deﬁnition 6.7. Let f : Rn → R be a real-valued function. The function f is continu-
ous if for all sequences
©
xkª∞
k=1 of vectors converging to a vector x ∈ Rn it holds that
limk→∞ f
¡
xk¢
= f (x).
Example. We list a few familiar examples of continuous functions:
1. f (x)=x2 is a continuous function on R.F o r ,l e t
©
xkª∞
k=1 be a sequence of real
numbers converging to x ∈ R, i.e., limk→∞ xk = x. Then, limk→∞
¡
xk¢2 =( x)
2,
that is, limk→∞ f
¡
xk¢
= f (x).
2. Let x =( x1,x 2) ∈ R2. The function f : R2 → R deﬁned by
f (x)=x1 + x2
is continuous. For, let
©
xkª∞
k=1 be a sequence of vectors in R2 converging to
x =( x1,x 2) ∈ R.B yD e ﬁnition 6.6, limk→∞ xk
1 = x1 and limk→∞ xk
2 = x2.T h i s
implies
lim
k→∞
x
k
1 + x
k
2 = x1 + x2,
so that limk→∞ f
¡
xk¢
= f (x).
3. The function f : R → R deﬁned by
f (x)=
(
2 x ≤ 1
xx > 1
is not continuous. This function clearly violates the intuition of continuity since
there is a jump at x =1 : if we draw its graph, at x =1we have to lift the
pen. More formally, to show that f does not satisﬁes Deﬁnition 6.7 it suﬃces
to provide an example of a sequence
©
xkª∞
k=1 of real numbers converging to a
real number x ∈ R, and such that it does not hold that limk→∞ f
¡
xk¢
= f (x).
Let us consider the sequence
©
1+1
k
ª∞
k=1.W eh a v elimk→∞
¡
1+1
k
¢
=1and, by
deﬁnition, f
¡
1+1
k
¢
=1+1
k. Therefore,
lim
k→∞
f
µ
1+
1
k
¶
=l i m
k→∞
µ
1+
1
k
¶
=16=2=f (1)
and we conclude that f is not continuous. It is important to notice that only a
“concrete” numerical example is required to show that continuity fails.
53We conclude with a simple but useful result.
Theorem 6.8. Let f : Rn → R and g : R → R be two continuous functions. Then,
the composition function g(f):Rn → R is continuous.
Proof. Let
©
xkª∞
k=1 be a sequence of vectors converging to a vector x ∈ Rn.S i n c e
f is continuous, limk→∞ f
¡
xk¢
= f (x). Therefore, the sequence of real numbers
©
f
¡
xk¢ª∞
k=1 converges to f (x). Hence, the continuity of g implies that limk→∞ g
¡
f
¡
xk¢¢
=
g(f (x)), and this proves that the composition function g(f) is continuous. ¤
6.3. Concavity
Concavity is a very interesting and convenient mathematical notion.
Deﬁnition 6.9. A function f : R → R is concave if, for all 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and all x and
x0 in R, it holds that
f (λx +( 1− λ)x
0) ≥ λf(x)+( 1− λ)f(x
0). (6.1)
If the inequality is strict, f is called strictly concave.
A concave function assigns a higher value to the expected value λx +( 1− λ)x0
than to the expected value λf(x)+(1−λ)f(x0). Geometrically, we have the following
ﬁgure:15
Figure 7 here.
Unlike concave functions, strictly concave functions cannot have linear parts in its
graph. For example, the following ﬁgure shows a concave, but not strictly concave,
function:
Figure 8 here.
Example. Many familiar functions are concave or strictly concave. Here is a set:
1. f(x)=ax − bx2 with a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0.
2. f(x)=
√
x.
15Recall that the points of the segment connecting (x,f (x)) and (x0,f(x0)) take the form
(λx +( 1− λ)x0,λf(x)+( 1− λ)f (x0)) for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
543. f(x)=l gx as long as x ≥ 0.
4. f(x)=1− e−x.
To check the deﬁnition of concavity is often cumbersome. Shortly we will see a very
convenient characterization of concavity in terms of second derivatives.
Chords of concave functions have the following very useful property.
Proposition 6.10. If f : R → R is concave and if y0 ≤ y ≤ x ≤ x0,t h e nt h ec h o r d
over (y,y0) has a larger slope than the chord over (x,x0),t h a ti s ,
f(x0) − f(x)
x0 − x
≤
f(y) − f(y0)
y − y0 .
When the inequality (6.1) is reversed, we have the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 6.11. Af u n c t i o nf : R → R is convex if, for all 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and all x and
x0 in R, it holds that
f (λx +( 1− λ)x
0) ≤ λf(x)+( 1− λ)f(x
0).
If the inequality is strict, f is called strictly convex.
It is easy to check that a function f is concave if and only if −f is convex, and vice
versa.
Example. f(x)=x2 for x ≥ 0,a n df(x)=ex are two simple convex functions.
Concave and convex functions have a neat characterization in terms of second deriv-
atives, provided they exist. Concavity and convexity are usually checked through these
convenient conditions on derivatives.
Theorem 6.12. Let f : R → R be a twice diﬀerentiable function.16 Then
(i) f is concave if and only if f00(x) ≤ 0 for all x in R.
16That is, f has both ﬁrst and second derivatives.
55(ii) f is strictly concave if and only if f00(x) < 0 for all x in R.
(iii) f is convex if and only if f00(x) ≥ 0 for all x in R.
(iv) f is strictly convex if and only if f00(x) > 0 for all x in R.
Example. We check the theorem on some examples:
1. Let f(x)=ax − bx2 with a ≥ 0 and b>0.T h e nf00(x)=−2b<0,s ot h a tt h e
function is strictly concave.
2. Let f(x)=
√
x for x ≥ 0.T h e n f00(x)=− 1
4
√
x3 < 0, so that the function is
strictly concave.
3. Let f(x)=l gx for x>0.T h e nf00(x)=− 1
x2 < 0, so that the function is strictly
concave.
4. Let f(x)=1− e−x.T h e n f00(x)=−e−x < 0, so that the function is strictly
concave.
5. Let f(x)=ex.T h e nf00(x)=ex > 0, so that the function is strictly convex.
Remark. In these deﬁnitions of concave and convex functions we made use of, re-
spectively, the weak inequalities ≥ and ≤. This means that we may have a function f
which satisﬁes both weak inequalities, i.e.,
f (λx +( 1− λ)x
0)=λf(x)+( 1− λ)f(x
0) (6.2)
for all pairs of real numbers x and x0,a n da l lλ such that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Such a function f,
which is both convex and concave, is called linear. Linear functions have the following
form:
f(x)=αx + β
where α and β are any two real numbers. Of course, linear functions are neither strictly
concave nor strictly convex as they do not satisfy the strict inequalities in Deﬁnitions
11 and 12. Indeed, because of these strict inequalities, no function can be both strictly
concave and convex.
56We conclude with a very useful result, Jensen’s inequality. The deﬁnition of con-
cavity requires that for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
f (λx +( 1− λ)x
0) ≥ λf(x)+( 1− λ)f(x
0).
Jensen’s inequality says that this inequality extends to n-tuple of coeﬃcients λ1,...,λ n
such that
Pn
i=1 λi =1and λi ∈ [0,1] for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. That is, it holds that:
f
Ã
n X
i=1
λixi
!
≥
n X
i=1
λif(xi),
where xi are real numbers.
For example, the proof of the equivalence between risk aversion and concavity of
the vN-M utility function is, basically, an application of Jensen’s inequality.
Of course, for convex functions the opposite inequality holds, while for strict con-
cavity and strict convexity the inequality is strict.
We prove the inequality for n =3 .W eh a v e :
f (λ1x1 + λ2x2 +( 1− λ1 − λ2)x3)=f
µ
λ1x1 +( 1− λ1)
λ2x2 +( 1− λ1 − λ2)x3
1 − λ1
¶
≥ λ1f(x1)+( 1− λ1)f
µ
λ2x2 +( 1− λ1 − λ2)x3
1 − λ1
¶
= λ1f(x1)+( 1− λ1)f
µ
λ2
1 − λ1
x2 +
1 − λ1 − λ2
1 − λ1
x3
¶
= λ1f(x1)+( 1− λ1)f
µ
λ2
1 − λ1
x2 +
µ
1 −
λ2
1 − λ1
¶
x3
¶
≥ λ1f(x1)+( 1− λ1)
λ2
1 − λ1
f(x2)
+(1 − λ1)
µ
1 −
λ2
1 − λ1
¶
f(x3)
= λ1f(x1)+λ2f(x2)+( 1− λ1 − λ2)f(x3).
Notice that we have used the equality 1−λ1−λ2
1−λ1 =1− λ2
1−λ1.
6.4. Optimization with concave functions
Let f : R → R be a real-valued concave and diﬀerentiable function and I an interval
of the real line R. We want to solve the following optimization problem
max
x∈I
f (x),
57that is, we want to ﬁnd the elements b x ∈ I such that
f (b x) ≥ f (x) for all x ∈ I. (6.3)
In this problem the critical distinction is when the interval I is open, i.e., I =( a,b) for
some a,b ∈ R, and when it is closed, i.e., I =[ a,b] for some a,b ∈ R. For example, in
the optimization problem maxx∈(0,1)
√
x, we are dealing with an open interval, while in
the problem maxx∈[0,1]
√
x, the interval is closed.
6.4.1. The case of (a,b)
In this case the problem is
max
x∈(a,b)
f (x), (6.4)
where a<bare two real numbers and f : R → R ar e a l - v a l u e dd i ﬀerentiable function.
We denote by argmaxx∈(a,b) f (x) the set of solutions to problem (6.4); that is, b x ∈
argmaxx∈(a,b) f (x) if f (b x) ≥ f (x) for all x ∈ (a,b).
Existence Existence is our ﬁrst concern: Does there always exist a solution to prob-
lem (6.4)? That is, is it always the case that argmaxx∈(a,b) f (x) 6= ∅?U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,i n
the case (a,b) the answer is: No. Let us consider the following three examples, shown
in Figure 9.
Figure 9 here.
1. Let f (x)=
√
x and (a,b)=( 0 ,1).T h ep r o b l e mmaxx∈(0,1)
√
x has no solutions,
i.e., argmaxx∈(0,1)
√
x = ∅.T h i se x a m p l es h o w st h a tp roblem (6.4) may not have
solutions.
2. Let f (x)=1 −x2 and (a,b)=( −1,1). The solution to the problem maxx∈(−1,1) (1 − x2)
is b x =0 , i.e., argmaxx∈(−1,1) (1 − x2)={0}.T h i se x a m p l es h o w st h a tp r o b l e m
(6.4) may have solutions.
3. Let
f(x)=
(
1 − x2 −1 ≤ x ≤ 0
10 <x≤ 1.
As will be seen, it can be checked that all points in the interval [0,1) are solutions
to problem (6.4), i.e., argmaxx∈(−1,1) f (x)=[ 0 ,1). This shows that problem (6.4)
58may have more than one solution. In fact, in this example there are an inﬁnite
number of solutions.
The last example introduces us to the next topic.
How many solutions? The next important question to answer is: provided that
argmaxx∈(a,b) f (x) 6= ∅, how many solutions are there? That is, how large is argmaxx∈(a,b) f (x)?
The answer is contained in the next result.
Theorem 6.13. Let f : R → R be a concave diﬀerentiable function. If
arg max
x∈(a,b)
f (x) 6= ∅
then argmaxx∈(a,b) f (x) consists either of only one element or of inﬁnitely many.
According to this neat result, either there is a unique solution to the optimization
problem (6.4) or there are inﬁnitely many. It is never the case that the solutions are a
ﬁnite number, i.e., 2, 3, and the like. For instance, in the examples above we have that
argmaxx∈(−1,1) (1 − x2) consists of only one element, the point 0, while for the function
f(x)=
(
1 − x2 −1 ≤ x ≤ 0
10 <x≤ 1.
the set argmaxx∈(−1,1) f (x) consists of inﬁnitely many elements, all the points con-
tained in [0,1).
Strictly concave functions are an important case in which argmaxx∈(a,b) f (x) con-
sists of a unique element.
Theorem 6.14. Let f : R → R be a strictly concave diﬀerentiable function. If
argmaxx∈(a,b) f (x) 6= ∅,t h e nargmaxx∈(a,b) f (x) consists of only one element.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove that if argmaxx∈(a,b) f (x) 6= ∅, then it consists of only one
element (i.e., it is a singleton).17 Suppose not. Then there are two distinct points, b x1
and b x2, in (a,b) that solve the problem (6.4). Since b x1 is a solution, by (6.3) it holds
that
f (b x1) ≥ f (x) for all x ∈ (a,b).
17In the mathematical terminology, a singleton is a set consisting of only a single element.
59In particular,
f (b x1) ≥ f (b x2). (6.5)
On the other hand, since b x2 is a solution, by 6.3 we have
f (b x2) ≥ f (x) for all x ∈ (a,b).
In particular,
f (b x2) ≥ f (b x1). (6.6)
Putting together (6.5) and (6.6) we therefore get
f (b x1)=f (b x2). (6.7)
Set b xt = tb x1 +( 1− t)b x2 for 0 <t<1. Clearly, b xt ∈ (a,b).B y t h e d e ﬁnition of
strict concavity we have
f (b xt)=f (tb x1 +( 1− t)b x2) >t f(b x1)+( 1− t)f (b x2). (6.8)
But, by (6.7), tf (b x1)+( 1− t)f (b x2)=f (b x1), so that (6.8) implies that
f (b xt) >f(b x1)
which contradicts the fact that b x1 is a solution to problem (6.4). We conclude that
there cannot be two distinct solutions b x1 and b x2; that is, the solution is unique. ¤
How to ﬁnd the solutions This brings us to the ﬁnal important question: is there
a simple criterion that can be used to decide whether or not argmaxx∈(a,b) f (x) is
nonempty and, if this the case, to ﬁnd the solutions? Remarkably, the answer is yes.
The next theorem provides such a criterion (its proof is omitted).
Theorem 6.15. If f : R → R is a concave diﬀerentiable function, the point b x ∈ (a,b)
is a solution to the optimization problem (6.4) if and only if f0 (b x)=0 .
Therefore, Theorem 6.15 provides a very simple procedure to check whether the
argmaxx∈(a,b) f (x) is nonempty and to ﬁn di t se l e m e n t s .A l lw eh a v et od oi st oc h e c k
if there are points b x ∈ (a,b) where the ﬁrst derivative f0 (b x) is zero. If there are, then
argmaxx∈(a,b) f (x) is nonempty and consists exactly of such points b x ∈ (a,b).
Finally, the following corollary is a straightforward but very useful consequence of
Theorems 6.14 and 6.15.
60Corollary 6.16. Let f : R → R be a strictly concave diﬀerentiable function. The
point b x ∈ (a,b) is the unique solution to the optimization problem (6.4) if and only if
f0 (b x)=0 .
6.4.2. The case of [a,b]
In this case the problem is:
max
x∈[a,b]
f (x), (6.9)
where a<ba r et w or e a ln u m b e r sa n df : R → R a real-valued concave diﬀerentiable
function. A bit of terminology: the points a and b are called boundary points; the
points x such that a<x<bare called interior points.
Existence In this case the following classic result, the Weierstrass Theorem,18 pro-
vides a neat answer to the existence question (the proof is omitted).
Theorem 6.17. The problem (6.9) has always at least one solution; that is, the set
argmaxx∈[a,b] f (x) is not empty.19
Therefore, we do not have to worry about the case argmaxx∈[a,b] f (x)=∅.
Example. To illustrate this result, let us go back to the function f (x)=
√
x
and [a,b]=[ 0 ,1]. I tc a nb ec h e c k e d( s e eb e l o w )t h a tt h es o l u t i o nt ot h ep r o b l e m
maxx∈[0,1]
√
x is b x =1 , i.e., argmaxx∈[0,1]
√
x = {1}.N o t i c et h a tt h ep o i n tb x =1does
not belong to (0,1) and this is why we could not use it in the problem maxx∈(0,1)
√
x.
Finally, notice also that in the case of [a,b] the set argmaxx∈[a,b] f (x) may consist of
more than one element. For instance, it is easy to check that argmax[−1,1] f3 (x)=[ 0 ,1],
where f3 (x) has been deﬁned above.
How many solutions The following counterpart of Theorem 6.13 holds.
Theorem 6.18. Let f : R → R beaconcavediﬀerentiable function. Then argmaxx∈[a,b] f (x)
consists either of only one element or of inﬁnitely many.
18Karl Weierstrass (1815-1897) was a famous German mathematician.
19The theorem holds for continuous functions, not necessarily diﬀerentiable and concave. In these
notes, however, we do not need that stronger version of the Weierstrass Theorem.
61Example. For the function f (x)=
√
x the problem maxx∈[0,1]
√
x has the unique
solution b x =1 . However, for the function
f(x)=
(
1 − x2 −1 ≤ x ≤ 0
10 <x≤ 1.
the optimization problem max[−1,1] f (x) has inﬁnitely many solutions: all the points b x
belonging to the interval [0,1].
Finally, the following counterpart of Theorem 6.14 holds.
Theorem 6.19. Let f : R → R be a strictly concave diﬀerentiable function. Then
argmaxx∈[a,b] f (x) consists of only one element.
How to ﬁnd the solutions By Theorem 6.17, we do not have to worry about the
case argmaxx∈[a,b] f (x)=∅. Solutions always exist. The problem is how to ﬁnd them.
Relative to the case (a,b), the novelty here is that now the solutions may be the
boundary points a and b.F o ri n s t a n c e ,t h i si st h ec a s ei nmaxx∈[0,1]
√
x.W h e na or b
are solutions, they are called boundary solutions. The solutions b x such that a<b x<b
are called interior solutions.
The following result provides a simple criterion for the existence of boundary solu-
tions.
Theorem 6.20. Let f : R → R be a concave diﬀerentiable function. The point a is a
solution to the problem maxx∈[a,b] f (x) if and only if f0 (a) ≤ 0. Similarly, the point b
is a solution if and only if f0 (b) ≥ 0.
Therefore, to decide whether boundary solutions exist, we have to calculate the
ﬁrst derivatives at the boundary points. For the left boundary point a,w eh a v et o
check whether the ﬁr s td e r i v a t i v ei sn o n p o s i t i v e ,f o rt h er i g h tb o u n d a r yp o i n tb,i fi ti s
nonnegative.
Example. Let f (x)=
√
x.T h e ﬁrst derivative f0 (x) is 1
2
√
x.I n p a r t i c u l a r , f0 (1)
= 1
2 > 0. According to Theorem 6.20 the point b x =1is a boundary solution. Moreover,
since f is strictly concave, 1 is the unique solution, i.e., argmaxx∈[0,1]
√
x = {1}.
Example. Let f (x)=1 −
¡
x + 1
2
¢2 on
£
0, 1
2
¤
.W e h a v e f0 (x)=−2x − 1 and,
in particular, f0 (0) = −1 < 0. According to Theorem 6.20 the point b x =0is a
62boundary solution. Moreover, since f is strictly concave, 0 is the unique solution, i.e.,
argmaxx∈[0,1]
√
x = {0}.
As to interior solutions, we have the following counterpart of Theorem 6.15.
Theorem 6.21. If f : R → R is a concave diﬀerentiable function, the point b x ∈ [a,b]
is an interior solution to the optimization problem (6.9) if and only if a<b x<band
f0 (b x)=0 .
In sum, Theorems 6.20 and 6.21 provide the following procedure to ﬁnd the solutions
to problem (6.9):
1. Consider separately the boundary and interior points.
2. Use Theorem 6.20 to check whether one of the boundary points is a solution.
3. Use Theorem 6.21 to check whether one of the interior points is a solution.
To illustrate the procedure, consider again the function
f(x)=
(
1 − x2 if x ∈ [−1,0]
1 if x ∈ (0,1].
We have
f
0(x)=
(
−2x if x ∈ [−1,0]
0 if x ∈ (0,1].
so that f0(x)=0for all x ∈ [0,1). By Theorem 6.21 all the points [0,1) are solutions
of the optimization problem max[−1,1] f (x).20 As for the boundary points −1 and 1,
it holds that f0 (−1) = 2 and f0(1) = 0, so that, by Theorem 6.20, the point 1 is a
solution as well, while −1 is not a solution. In sum, all the points [0,1] are solutions.
6.4.3. Intermediate cases
Up to now we have considered the intervals of the form (a,b) and [a,b]. However, there
exist also intervals of the form (a,b] and [a,b), with relative optimization problems
maxx∈(a,b] f (x) and maxx∈[a,b) f (x). These problems share features of both the cases
considered. In particular:
20Notice that the point 0 is an interior point of the interval [−1,1].
631. As in the case (a,b), the set of solutions may be empty; that is, the Weierstrass
Theorem does not hold.
2. As in the case [a,b] we have to distinguish between interior and boundary points.
Consequently, solutions may not exists because the Weierstrass Theorem does not
hold, but when they do exist, in order to ﬁnd them we just have to proceed as in the
case [a,b], by distinguishing interior and boundary points.
6.5. Some functional equations
The following functional equation is quite useful; the proof is based on Aczel (1966)
pp. 148-150.
Theorem 6.22. Suppose f,h,k :[ 0 ,1] → R are functions satisfying
f (x + y)=h(y)f (x)+k(x) (6.10)
for all x and y such that 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1,a n d0 ≤ x + y ≤ 1.I f f is strictly
monotone and h is strictly positive, then for all x ∈ [0,1] we have either
f (x)=α + γe
βx,h (x)=e
βx,k (x)=α
£
1 − e
βx¤
, (6.11)
or
f (x)=α + γx, h(x)=1 ,k (x)=γx, (6.12)
where γ 6=0 , β 6=0 ,a n dα are arbitrary constants.
The proof rests on the following lema, a variation of Cauchy’s functional equation.
Lemma 6.23. Suppose f :[ 0 ,1] → R is a function satisfying
f (x + y)=f (x)+f (y) (6.13)
for all x and y such that 0 ≤ x<1, 0 ≤ y<1,a n d0 ≤ x + y ≤ 1.I ff is continuous
at some point x0 in (0,1),t h e n
f (x)=f (1)x (6.14)
for all x ∈ [0,1].
64Proof. We ﬁrst prove that if f is continuous at x0 ∈ (0,1) and it satisﬁes (6.13), then
it is continuous on the whole interval (0,1).L e tx ∈ (0,1) and let {xk}
∞
k=1 ⊆ (0,1) be
a sequence such that xk → x.W ew a n tt os h o wt h a tlimk f (xk)=f (x).
Assume ﬁrst that x0 ≥ x and set h = x0 − x. It is immediate to check that, by
(6.13), f (x)=f (x0) − f (h).A sxk → x,w eh a v exk + h → x + h = x0.T h e r e f o r e ,
if k is large enough, the quantity xk + h can be taken close enough to x0 so that
xk + h ∈ (0,1). In turn, this implies that, by (6.13), eventually we have
f (xk + h)=f (xk)+f (h). (6.15)
As f is continuous at x0,i th o l d slimk f (xk + h)=f (x0). By (6.15), this implies
f (x0) = lim
k
f (xk + h) = lim
k
f (xk)+f (h),
and so limk f (xk)=f (x0) − f (h)=f (x).T h i sp r o v e st h a tlimk f (xk)=f (x) when
x0 ≥ x.
Next assume that x0 <xand set h = x−x0.A sxk → x,w eh a v exk−h → x−h =
x0. Therefore, if k is large enough, the quantity xk − h can be taken close enough to
x0 so that xk − h ∈ (0,1). In turn, this implies that, by (6.13), eventually we have
f (xk − h)=f (xk) − f (h). (6.16)
As f is continuous at x0,i th o l d slimk f (xk − h)=f (x0). By (6.16), this implies
f (x0) = lim
k
f (xk − h) = lim
k
f (xk) − f (h),
and so limn f (xk)=f (x0)+f (h)=f (x). We conclude that limk f (xk)=f (x) even
when x0 <x .
Summing up, we have proven that f is continuous on (0,1). We can now complete
the proof. Given any integer n>1,l e tx =1 /n. Eq. (6.13) implies
f (1) = f

 

n times z }| {
1
n
+ ···+
1
n

 
 =
n times z }| {
f
µ
1
n
¶
+ ···+ f
µ
1
n
¶
= nf
µ
1
n
¶
,
65and so f (1/n)=( 1 /n)f (1).N o w ,l e tm be any other integer with m ≤ n.A g a i n ,E q .
(6.13) implies
f
³m
n
´
= f

 

m times z }| {
1
n
+ ···+
1
n

 
 =
m times z }| {
f
µ
1
n
¶
+ ···+ f
µ
1
n
¶
= mf
µ
1
n
¶
=
m
n
f (1).
Since n and m were arbitrary, we conclude that Eq. (6.14) holds for each rational
number m/n ∈ (0,1),i . e . ,
f
³m
n
´
=
m
n
f (1). (6.17)
Now, let x ∈ (0,1). As well-known, there is a sequence {xk}
∞
k=1 ⊆ [0,1] of rational
numbers such that xk → x. Hence, by Eq. (6.17) and by the continuity of f on (0,1),
we have:
f (x) = lim
k
f (xk) = lim
k
xkf (1) = xf (1).
This proves that Eq. (6.14) holds for all x ∈ (0,1]. It remain to consider x =0 .B y
Eq. (6.13), f (y)=f (0) + f (y) for all y ∈ [0,1). Hence, f (0) = 0, and so Eq. (6.14)
holds for x =0as well.
Having established Lemma 6.23, we can now prove Theorem 6.22.
Proof of Theorem 6.22. Before starting, a piece of terminology: say that x and y
are admissible if they are such that 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1,a n d0 ≤ x + y ≤ 1.
Consider y =0 .B y E q .( 6 . 1 0 ) , f (x)=h(0)f (x)+k(0) for each x ∈ [0,1].
Since f is strictly monotone, it is easy to see that there are x1,x 2 ∈ [0,1] such that
f (x1) 6= f (x2), f (x1) 6=0 ,a n df (x2) 6=0 . Hence,
(
f (x1)(1− h(0)) = k(0),
f (x2)(1− h(0)) = k(0),
which implies
h(0) = 1 and k(0) = 0. (6.18)
Next, Consider x =0 .B yE q .( 6 . 1 0 ) ,f (y)=h(y)f (0) + k(y) for each y ∈ [0,1].
If we subtract this equation from Eq. (6.10), we get
f (x + y) − f (y)=h(y)(f (x) − f (0)) (6.19)
66for all admissible x and y.S e te f (x)=f (x) − f (0) for each x ∈ [0,1].B yE q .( 6 . 1 9 ) ,
we then have
e f (x + y)=f (x + y) − f (0) = h(y)(f (x) − f (0)) + f (y) − f (0) (6.20)
= h(y) e f (x)+e f (y)
for all admissible x and y. Interchanging the variables x and y in Eq. (6.20), we have
e f (x + y)=h(x) e f (y)+e f (x)
for all admissible x and y. Hence, for all such x and y,w eh a v eh(y) e f (x)+e f (y)=
h(x) e f (y)+e f (x),s ot h a t
e f (x)(h(y) − 1) = e f (y)(h(x) − 1) (6.21)
for all admissible xand y.
Assume that there exists some x0 ∈ (0,1) such that h(x0) 6=1 .W ew a n tt os h o w
that this implies h(x) 6=1for all x ∈ (0,1). We begin by showing that h(x) 6=1
for all x ∈ (0,1 − x0].S i n c ee f is injective and e f (0) = 0,w eh a v ee f (x) 6=0for all
x ∈ (0,1].T h u s ,e f (x)(h(x0) − 1) 6=0for all x ∈ (0,1 − x0],a n ds o ,b yE q .( 6 . 2 1 ) ,
e f (x0)(h(x) − 1) 6=0for all such x. In turn, since e f (x0) 6=0 , this implies h(x) 6=1
for all x ∈ (0,1−x0]. On the other hand, as h(1 − x0) 6=1 , the same argument shows
that h(x) 6=1for all x ≤ 1 − (1 − x0)=x0. All this proves that h(x) 6=1for all
x ∈ (0,x 0] whenever h(x0) 6=1 . It remains to prove that h(x) 6=1for all x ∈ (x0,1).
Suppose, per contra,t h a th(x)=1for some x ∈ (x0,1).B yE q .( 6 . 2 1 ) ,
e f (x)(h(x) − 1) = 0, (6.22)
for all x ∈ (0,1 − x].S i n c ee f (x) 6=0 , Eq. (6.22) implies h(x)=1for all x ≤ 1 − x.
In particular, h(1 − x)=1and so, by the same argument, h(x)=1for all x ≤
1 − (1 − x)=x.I ns u m ,h(x)=1implies h(x)=1for all x ≤ x, which contradicts
h(x0) 6=1 .W ec o n c l u d et h a th(x) 6=1for all x ∈ (0,1) whenever h(x0) 6=1for some
x0 ∈ (0,1).
Summing up, we have showed that either h(x) 6=1for all x ∈ (0,1) or h(x)=1
for all x ∈ (0,1). We consider these two case separately.
67Case 1. Assume h(x)=1for all x ∈ (0,1). By Eq. (6.18), we actually have h(x)=1
for all x ∈ [0,1).E q .( 6 . 2 0 )b e c o m e s
e f (x + y)=e f (y)+e f (x)
for all x and y such that 0 ≤ x<1, 0 ≤ y<1,a n d0 ≤ x+y ≤ 1. By Lemma 6.23 we
have e f (x)=e f (1)x for all x ∈ [0,1]. Consequently, we have f (x)=e f (1)x + f (0) for
each x ∈ [0,1], and so, by settting γ = e f (1) and α = f (0),w eg e tt h es o l u t i o n( 6 . 1 2 ) .
Case 2. Assume h(x) 6=1for all x ∈ (0,1).L e tx0 ∈ (0,1).B yE q .( 6 . 2 1 ) ,
e f (x0)
h(x0) − 1
=
e f (x)
h(x) − 1
(6.23)
for all x ∈ (0,1 − x0].S e t γ = e f (x0)/(h(x0) − 1). As Eq. (6.23) holds for 1 − x0,
again by Eq. (6.21) we have
γ =
e f (1 − x0)
h(1 − x0) − 1
=
e f (x)
h(x) − 1
(6.24)
for all 0 <x≤ 1 − (1 − x0)=x0, i.e., for all x ∈ (0,x 0]. In turn, this implies that Eq.
(6.24) holds for all x ∈ (0,1). For, suppose per contra that γ 6= e f (x)/(h(x) − 1) for
some x ∈ (x0,1). By what it has been proved below, since x0 ∈ (0,x],w ew o u l dt h e n
have
e f (x0)
h(x0) − 1
=
e f (x)
h(x) − 1
6= γ,
a contradiction. We conclude that e f (x)/(h(x) − 1) = γ for all x ∈ (0,1),a n ds o
e f (x)=γ (h(x) − 1) (6.25)
for all x ∈ [0,1) (recall that h(0) = 1). Replacing Eq. (6.25) in (6.20), we get
γ (h(x + y) − 1) = γ (h(x) − 1)h(y)+γ (h(y) − 1)
for all x and y such that 0 ≤ x<1, 0 ≤ y<1,a n d0 ≤ x + y<1. Hence, for all such
x and y we get
h(x + y)=h(x)h(y). (6.26)
68Now, given any x,y ∈ (0,1), Eq. (6.20) implies that
e f (1) = h(x) e f (1 − x)+e f (x)=h(y) e f (1 − y)+e f (y).
If we replace Eq. (6.25) in this equation, we get
h(x)γ (h(1 − x) − 1) + γ (h(x) − 1) = h(y)γ (h(1 − y) − 1) + γ (h(y) − 1),
which implies
h(x)h(1 − x)=h(y)h(1 − y). (6.27)
Given any x ∈ (0,1),s e tκ = h(x)h(1 − x).B yE q .( 6 . 2 7 ) ,κ is well-deﬁned. Deﬁne
g :[ 0 ,1] → R by
g(x)=
(
h(x) x ∈ [0,1)
κx =1
By Eqs. (6.18), (6.26) and (6.27), we have
g(x + y)=g(x)g(y) (6.28)
for all x and y such that 0 ≤ x<1, 0 ≤ y<1,a n d0 ≤ x+y ≤ 1.S e tw(x)=l gg(x)
for all x ∈ [0,1]. Since by hypothesis h(x) > 0,w ea l s oh a v eg(x) > 0 and so the
function w is well-deﬁned. By Eq. (6.28) we have
w(x + y)=l gg(x + y)=l gg(x)g(y)=l gg(x)+l gg(y)=w(x)+w(y)
for all x and y such that 0 ≤ x<1, 0 ≤ y<1,a n d0 ≤ x + y<1. Since Eq. (6.25)
holds and e f, being strictly monotone, is continuous at some point of (0,1), it follows
that g as well is continuous at some point of (0,1). Then, by Lemma 6.23 we have
w(x)=w(1)x for all x ∈ [0,1].I fg(1) = 1,t h e nw(1) = 0, and so we only have the
trivial solution g(x)=1for all x ∈ [0,1]. We therefore get back to the case h(x)=1for
all x ∈ [0,1], which we already studied in Case 1. Hence, assume g(1) 6=1 . This implies
that g(x)=ew(1)x for all x ∈ [0,1].T h u s ,h(x)=ew(1)x for all x ∈ [0,1) and, ﬁxed
any x ∈ (0,1),b yd e ﬁnition we have h(1) = h(x)h(1 − x)=ew(1)xew(1)(1−x) = ew(1).
We conclude that h(x)=ew(1)x for all x ∈ [0,1].
By Eq. (6.25),
f (x)=γe
w(1)x − γ + f (0)
69for all x ∈ [0,1). If we set β = w(1) and α = −γ + f (0), we get Eq. (6.11) for all
x ∈ [0,1).A st ox =1 , by Eq. (6.10) we can write
f (1) = h
µ
1
2
¶
f
µ
1
2
¶
+ k
µ
1
2
¶
= e
β
2
³
α + γe
β
2
´
+ α
h
1 − e
β
2
i
= α + γe
β,
which proves that Eq. (6.11) holds for x =1as well. This completes the proof of Case
2.
Summing up, we have proven that Eqs. (6.11) and (6.12) are the only possible
solutions under the stated hypotheses on f and h.
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